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Mandatory Financial Reporting and Voluntary Disclosure: The Effect of 
Mandatory IFRS Adoption on Management Forecasts 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This study examines the effect of the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) on voluntary disclosure. Using a difference-in-difference analysis, we 
document a significant increase in the likelihood and frequency of management earnings 
forecasts following mandatory IFRS adoption, consistent with the notion that IFRS adoption 
alters firms’ disclosure incentives in response to increased capital-market demand. We find the 
increase to be larger among firms domiciled in code-law countries, suggesting a catching-up 
effect among firms facing low disclosure incentives pre-adoption. We then propose and test three 
channels through which IFRS adoption could alter firms’ disclosure incentives: improved 
earnings quality, increased shareholder demand, and increased analyst demand. We find 
evidence consistent with all three channels.   
 
 
Keywords: Voluntary disclosure, IFRS, Management forecasts, Legal regime, Capital-market 
demand 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2005, more than two dozen countries around the world mandatorily changed their 
accounting standards to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), and thousands of 
firms were simultaneously affected by this mandate. This event provides us with a plausible 
setting to examine whether the changes in mandatory financial reporting affect firms’ voluntary 
disclosure behavior and, more importantly, to understand the underlying channels. 
On the one hand, Ball, Robin, and Wu (2003) argue that accounting standards per se play 
a limited role in shaping firms’ financial reporting practices. They posit instead that these 
practices are primarily determined by firms’ disclosure incentives to meet the demand for 
transparency from outside capital markets. Therefore, if IFRS adoption is a mere change in 
accounting standards as a label, it should not have any impact on firms’ voluntary disclosure 
behavior. On the other hand, a large body of literature documents various capital-market benefits 
associated with mandatory IFRS adoption (Daske, Hail, Leuz, and Verdi 2008; Li 2010; DeFond, 
Hu, Hung, and Li 2011; Tan, Wang, and Welker 2011; among others). Therefore, IFRS adoption 
could alter firms’ disclosure incentives in response to the increased capital-market demand for 
disclosure.  
To examine the average effect of IFRS adoption on voluntary disclosure, we employ a 
difference-in-difference research design to examine the changes in management earnings 
forecasts issued between 2002 and 2004 (pre-adoption) and between 2005 and 2010 (post-
adoption). Our treatment sample includes mandatory adopters from 26 countries that mandated 
IFRS adoption in 2005. We use three different control samples: the first includes all non-IFRS 
adopters from 17 countries where IFRS was not mandated during our sample period; the second 
includes a propensity-score-matched (PSM) group of non-IFRS adopters from these non-IFRS-
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mandating countries; the third control group includes firms from IFRS-mandating countries that 
voluntarily adopted IFRS prior to 2005. We document a significant increase in the likelihood and 
frequency of management forecast issuance following the mandatory IFRS adoption in our 
treatment sample for all three control samples after controlling for firm characteristics as well as 
country, year, and industry fixed effects. Greater increases are observed in countries whose pre-
IFRS domestic standards differed more from the IFRS standards. We also examine whether the 
increase is due to IFRS adoption per se or concurrent changes in enforcement or reporting 
frequency. We do not find evidence supporting either alternative explanation. 
Next, we explore cross-sectional variation in the effect of IFRS adoption on management 
forecasts. Ball, Kothari, and Robin (2000) argue that the demand for public disclosure is largely 
determined by different governance models used in common-law and code-law systems. Firms in 
common-law countries use a “shareholder” governance model and face high demand for public 
disclosure from outside capital markets. In contrast, firms in code-law countries use a 
“stakeholder” governance model and rely on private communications rather than public 
disclosure to resolve information asymmetry. Therefore, it is unclear whether the effects of IFRS 
adoption would apply to firms in code-law countries given the limited demand for disclosure 
from capital markets. However, compared to adopting countries’ previous domestic standards, 
IFRS has a common-law origin and a capital-market focus. Given the various capital-market 
benefits, IFRS adoption may alter firms’ disclosure incentives, even in code-law countries, and 
push their disclosure behavior toward a more transparent common-law regime. To examine the 
differential effect of IFRS adoption on firms with different governance models, we split our 
treatment sample into common-law and code-law countries. We observe a significant increase in 
management forecasts in both common-law and code-law countries following the adoption, with 
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the latter group experiencing even larger increases. Further analysis suggests a “catching-up 
effect” in forecasts among code-law firms, i.e., code-law firms issue fewer management forecasts 
than common-law firms pre-adoption, but they issue a similar amount of forecasts after IFRS 
adoption. These findings are consistent with the argument that IFRS adoption has driven code-
law firms’ disclosure incentives toward more voluntary disclosure. 
We next examine the underlying channels for the increase in management forecasts 
among code-law firms. Based on prior literature, we propose and test three sources for the 
increase in capital-market demand for management forecasts: improved earnings quality, 
increased shareholder demand, and increased analyst demand. First, a large body of literature 
documents evidence suggesting improved accounting information quality following IFRS 
adoption (Barth, Landsman, and Lang 2008; Landsman, Maydew, and Thornock 2012; among 
others). As a result of the increased usefulness and informativeness of earnings, investors may 
demand more disclosure on future earnings. We use the level of discretionary accruals as an 
inverse measure for earnings quality. Second, recent literature finds that IFRS adoption attracts 
more investments from foreign institutions (Covrig, DeFond, and Hung 2007; DeFond et al. 
2011; Florou and Pope 2012). Therefore, managers in IFRS-adopting countries may voluntarily 
disclose more to meet the higher demand for transparency from these sophisticated investors 
(Ajinkya, Bhojraj, and Sengupta 2005). We use foreign institutional ownership to measure 
shareholder demand. Third, prior literature documents increased analyst coverage following 
IFRS adoption (Byard, Li, and Yu 2011; Tan et al. 2011). Therefore, managers may issue more 
management forecasts to meet increased analyst demand (Lang and Lundholm 1996; Cotter, 
Tuna, and Wysocki 2006). We use the number of analysts following to measure analyst demand. 
We find that IFRS-adopting firms that experience larger increases in earnings quality, 
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shareholder demand, and analyst demand issue more management forecasts following IFRS 
adoption, especially among those domiciled in code-law countries. These findings corroborate 
our argument that IFRS adoption increases code-law firms’ incentives for more disclosure.  
Finally, we examine several alternative channels through which mandatory IFRS 
adoption could lead to more voluntary disclosure. The first two channels are the increased supply 
of information by the managers. First, firms may face higher litigation risk under “principles-
based” IFRS standards and therefore disclose more to reduce the heightened risk. Second, 
managers may possess more forward-looking information under “fair-value oriented” IFRS 
standards and are therefore more able to supply such information. The third channel is the 
increased competition from peers. Under IFRS, firms across different countries report under a set 
of uniform accounting standards and face increased uniformity. Therefore, firms may disclose 
more as a result of increased peer pressure. The last alternative channel is the increased 
uncertainty about future earnings caused by a major standard change. Firms may try to disclose 
more to reduce such uncertainty. We do not find evidence supporting any of these alternative 
channels.  
Our study makes several contributions. First, it adds to the literature that examines the 
effects of IFRS adoption. Prior studies generally document positive effects of IFRS adoption on 
firms’ information environment and capital markets (Daske et al. 2008; Landsman et al. 2012; 
Byard et al. 2011; Tan et al. 2011; among others). Our study extends this stream of research by 
examining the effect of IFRS adoption on discretionary managerial disclosure behavior. The 
result that management forecasts increase following IFRS adoption suggests an additional 
mechanism through which IFRS adoption could improve firms’ information environment and 
benefit capital markets. By documenting the differential effects in countries with different legal 
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origins and identifying the specific capital-market channels, our study complements Daske, Hail, 
Leuz, and Verdi (2013), which explores the heterogeneity in disclosure incentive changes as 
mechanisms through which voluntary IFRS adoption benefits capital markets.  
Second, our paper adds to the literature on the interplay between mandatory financial 
reporting and voluntary disclosure. Prior studies in this area often rely on analyses within a 
single country and firm-level metrics for both mandatory and voluntary disclosure, which are 
endogenously determined (Francis, Nanda, and Olsson 2008; Ball, Jayaraman, and Shivakumar 
2012). For example, managers of poorly governed firms may have incentives to maintain low 
levels of financial reporting quality as well as choose to provide little voluntary disclosure, 
which results in an observed positive association between mandatory reporting quality and 
voluntary disclosure. Without examining the specific mechanisms through which these two 
constructs are related, showing causality remains a challenge in these studies.1 The IFRS setting 
allows us to explore the heterogeneity among IFRS-adopting countries and firms and to identify 
the changes in firms’ disclosure incentives to meet capital-market demand as the underlying 
mechanisms driving the relation. Bischof and Daske (2013) find an increase in subsequent 
voluntary disclosure following a one-time mandatory disclosure of sovereign risk exposures by 
banks in the European Union (EU). They attribute this finding to a shift in voluntary disclosure 
equilibrium. Our paper complements their study by examining a more permanent and pervasive 
change in mandatory reporting and, more importantly, by testing the underlying channels 
through which mandatory reporting shifts the voluntary disclosure equilibrium.   
                                                          1 Although Ball et al. (2012) also study the effects of the introduction of SOX on voluntary disclosure, they 
acknowledge that the introduction is endogenous to the relatively unique events during that period, and shifts in 
litigation risks during that period could have caused the introduction of SOX and a simultaneous increase in 
voluntary disclosure. Although the introduction of IFRS could also be endogenous, the observed positive effects of 
the mandatory adoption on voluntary disclosure across a large number of countries are unlikely to be driven by a 
few countries’ endogenous choice.  
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Third, our paper also contributes to the literature on management forecasts. Thus far, 
extant research in this area is mainly based on US data, and there is very limited evidence outside 
the US.2 Our paper contributes to this stream of literature by providing large sample evidence on 
management forecasts across more than 40 countries. A concurrent paper by Ng, Tsang, and 
Yang (2012) examines a similar issue. Our paper differs from theirs in two ways. First, we 
document a catching-up effect in management forecasts between firms located in code-law and 
common-law countries. We argue that this effect is due to the common-law-oriented IFRS 
shifting firms’ disclosure incentives toward a more capital-market-oriented regime. Second, we 
examine the specific channels through which mandatory IFRS adoption affects firms’ disclosure 
incentives.  
 
II. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT  
A firm’s voluntary disclosure decision is an equilibrium outcome of its underlying 
incentives and disincentives for disclosure. Ex ante, it is unclear whether and how a change in 
mandatory reporting standards, i.e., mandatory IFRS adoption, could have any substantial impact 
on a firm’s voluntary disclosure behavior.  
A mere change in accounting standards, without corresponding changes in firms’ 
disclosure incentives, is unlikely to have any substantial impact on firms’ disclosure behavior.  
Consistent with this argument, Ball et al. (2003) find that accounting standards per se play a 
limited role in shaping firms’ financial reporting practices. Daske et al. (2013) find that IFRS has 
a limited capital-market impact among firms that only adopted them as a label without any 
                                                          
2 Examples of studies examining management forecasts outside the US include Baginski, Hassell, and Kimbrough 
(2002), examining forecasts in Canada; Kato, Skinner, and Kunimura (2009), examining forecasts in Japan; 
Radhakrishnan, Tsang, and Yang (2012), examining forecasts around the world; and Huang, Li, Tse, and Tucker 
(2014), examining forecasts in China. 
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changes in their underlying disclosure incentives. Therefore, we should expect low or no impact 
of mandatory IFRS adoption on firms’ voluntary disclosure behavior.  
On the other hand, the objective of IFRS is to provide useful financial information to 
external investors in the decision-making process (IASB’s Conceptual Framework for Financial 
Reporting). Consistent with this objective, there is a large body of literature documenting various 
capital-market benefits associated with mandatory IFRS adoption (Daske et al. 2008; Li 2010; 
DeFond et al. 2011; Tan et al. 2011; among others). We propose three channels through which 
IFRS adoption could alter firms’ disclosure incentives in response to the increased capital-market 
demand.  
First, firms may disclose more following mandatory IFRS adoption as a result of 
improved earnings quality. IFRS aims to produce high-quality financial statements, such as those 
reflecting economic substance more than legal form, those reflecting economic gains and losses 
in a more timely fashion, and those making earnings more informative (Ball 2006). Prior studies 
document both direct and indirect evidence consistent with this objective. For example, using a 
sample of voluntary adopters, Barth et al. (2008) find that firms applying IAS have higher 
accounting quality, as evidenced by less earnings management, more timely loss recognition, and 
more value-relevant accounting numbers. Landsman et al. (2012) find that the information 
content of earnings announcements increases following the mandatory adoption of IFRS. Wu 
and Zhang (2009) and Ozkan, Singer, and You (2012) find that accounting information is more 
useful for internal evaluation after IFRS adoption. Therefore, as accounting becomes more useful 
to investors for evaluation purposes, investors may demand more disclosure of future earnings to 
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help them make timely decisions.3 Consistent with this argument, Francis et al. (2008) find that 
firms with higher earnings quality have more extensive voluntary disclosure.   
Second, recent literature documents an increase in institutional ownership following 
IFRS adoption. For example, Covrig et al. (2007) and DeFond et al. (2011) find that both 
voluntary and mandatory IFRS adoption attracts more foreign mutual fund investors. Florou and 
Pope (2012) also document an increase in institutional holdings for mandatory IFRS adopters. 
Sophisticated investors, especially institutional shareholders, often have a higher demand for 
transparency and require more voluntary disclosure (Healy, Hutton, and Palepu 1999; Ajinkya et 
al. 2005). Therefore, firms may disclose more after IFRS adoption in response to the increased 
demand for transparency from these sophisticated shareholders.  
Third, recent literature documents an increase in analyst coverage following IFRS 
adoption. For example, Tan et al. (2011) find that mandatory IFRS adoption attracts more 
analysts and improves the usefulness of accounting information to financial analysts. Landsman 
et al. (2012) and Daske et al. (2013) attribute the improved information content of earnings and 
capital-market benefits following IFRS adoption partially to higher analyst demand. As major 
users of firms’ financial information, analysts often demand more public disclosure (Lang and 
Lundholm 1996; Cotter et al. 2006). Therefore, firms may disclose more after IFRS adoption in 
response to the increased demand from financial analysts.  
Alternatively, mandatory IFRS adoption could also have a negative impact on voluntary 
disclosure. Jung and Kwon (1988) and Verrecchia (1990) show theoretically that the more is 
known about a set of risky assets a priori, the less pressure the market exerts on a manger to 
                                                          
3 Another relevant paper along this line is Ball et al. (2012), who document a positive association between firms’ 
audit fees and management forecasts. Ball et al. (2012) emphasize the verifiability, rather than the information 
quality, of mandatory financial reports. They argue that the desired quantities of audited financial reports and 
voluntary disclosure are jointly determined, and firms allocating more resources to voluntary disclosure are likely to 
allocate more resources to audited financial reports. 
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reveal what he or she knows privately. In other words, an exogenous decrease in the uncertainty 
about the value of assets due to an increase in earnings quality could reduce the need for 
voluntary disclosure. In addition, since institutional investors and analysts often possess their 
own means and resources to acquire private information, the need for public disclosure may 
diminish when firms’ investor base becomes more sophisticated and when analyst coverage 
increases.4 
Due to the above competing arguments, we propose the following two-tailed hypothesis: 
H1: Mandatory IFRS adoption has no impact on voluntary disclosure. 
Ball et al. (2000) argue that the demand for public disclosure is largely determined by 
different governance models used in common-law and code-law systems. In common-law 
countries, firms use a “shareholder” governance model. Shareholders alone elect the governing 
board. Because shareholders are the residual claimants, they have incentives to effectively 
monitor managers. Managers in common-law countries often face high monitoring pressures 
from external capital markets and analysts. In addition, because the ownership is often dispersed 
in common-law countries, outside shareholders face high information asymmetry and, therefore, 
greater demand for timely public disclosure. In contrast, firms in code-law countries rely on a 
“stakeholder” governance model, and various stakeholders, such as the government, lenders, and 
employees, often have private inside access to information. Thus, the demand for timely public 
disclosure is low.5 Consistent with this argument, Ball et al. (2000) find that financial reporting 
quality, measured as timely loss recognition, is lower in code-law than common-law countries. 
Along the same line, Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith (2004) find that financial reports are less 
                                                          
4 We thank the editor for suggesting this alternative view 
5  For example, in Germany, a code-law country, employees and banks both have representations on firms’ 
supervisory boards. The supervisory board appoints and monitors the managerial board, which oversees financial 
reporting. Because managers often have close relations to these stakeholders, the information asymmetry is resolved 
through private communications. 
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transparent in countries with high state ownership, and Bharath, Sunder, and Sunder (2008) find 
that firms with better access to private credit face lower incentives for disclosure.  Therefore, due 
to the low demand for public disclosure, we expect a low or no impact of mandatory IFRS 
adoption on firms domiciled in code-law countries where the demand for disclosure is low. On 
the other hand, compared with adopting-countries’ prior domestic accounting standards, IFRS 
has a capital-market focus and a common-law orientation. Given the various capital-market 
benefits discussed above, IFRS adoption may alter code-law firms’ disclosure incentives and 
push their disclosure behavior toward a more transparent common-law regime. Our second 
hypothesis with regard to a code-law regime is stated below: 
H2: Mandatory IFRS adoption has no impact on voluntary disclosure in code-law 
countries. 
 
III. DATA AND SAMPLE SELECTION 
To proxy for voluntary disclosure, we focus on the extent to which managers provide 
earnings forecasts, the most prominent performance measure a firm supplies to investors. We 
obtain data on management earnings forecasts from Standard & Poor’s Capital IQ database for 
the years between 2002 and 2010. 6  We begin with an initial sample of 42,922 firm-year 
observations from 30 countries that mandated IFRS in 2005. Next, we obtain accounting and 
stock price data from Compustat Global, institutional ownership data from FactSet, and analyst 
following data from I/B/E/S. 7  We remove 15,329 observations without sufficient data to 
                                                          
6 A detailed description of the management forecast data in Capital IQ is included in the Internet Appendix. 
7 Firm-level information is drawn from Compustat Global rather than WorldScope to mitigate the data coverage 
concern. In our analysis, we treat firm-years without management forecasts as non-forecasters, but it could be the 
case that these firm-years were not covered by Capital IQ. Because Compustat and Capital IQ both belong to 
Standard & Poor’s and because Capital IQ provides a data file directly linking Gvkey with Company ID (unique 
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calculate the control variables used in regressions. We exclude 464 firm-years in those countries 
that did not use IFRS post-adoption or did not use local accounting standards pre-adoption, or 
firm-years where the accounting standards were not disclosed. 8  We also exclude 6,837 
observations for firms operating in financial industries (SIC 6000-6999), as they have different 
financial statements. This selection process generates a treatment sample of 20,292 firm-year 
observations from 26 countries. 
 We use three different control samples. The first includes all non-IFRS adopters from 17 
countries where IFRS was not mandated during our sample period.9 To construct this sample, we 
exclude firm-years if IFRS or IAS was voluntarily adopted during our sample period. We also 
exclude Chinese firms, as management forecasts were partially mandated in China.10 We follow 
a similar approach to exclude firm-years without sufficient data to calculate the control variables 
used in regressions and financial firms. This approach generates a full control sample of 60,585 
firm-year observations from 17 countries.  
A concern with using all firms in non-IFRS countries as the control is their comparability 
with firms in IFRS countries in terms of disclosure incentives. To address this concern, we 
employ a propensity-score-matching (PSM) technique to pair firms in treatment and control 
groups based on observable characteristics. We first run a logit regression to model the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
company identifiers used in Compustat Global and Capital IQ, respectively), we believe Compustat Global’s 
coverage is likely more similar to Capital IQ than WorldScope.  
8 Firms in our treatment countries that did not use IFRS after the mandatory adoption date might be those being 
exempted from mandatory adoption. For example, in certain countries, firms may be allowed to follow US GAAP 
for financial reporting. These observations are removed in our analysis to create a cleaner comparison between local 
GAAP in the pre-adoption period and IFRS in the post-adoption period.  
9 To maintain a clean control sample, we exclude countries that adopted IFRS in years other than 2005 during our 
sample period, including Singapore (2003), New Zealand (2007), Pakistan (2009), Israel (2008), Turkey (2008), and 
Brazil (2010).   
10  Chinese mandatory rules on management forecasts changed several times during our sample period, which 
contaminates China as a clean control group. See Huang et al. (2014) for a detailed discussion on this topic. 
Management forecasts in Japan were fully mandated during our sample period (Kato et al. 2009). We keep Japanese 
firms in our control group, as we expect mandatory IFRS adoption to have no impact on their forecast behavior. Our 
results are unchanged when we exclude Japan from our control group.     
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probability of a firm being in an IFRS country. We use all the firm-level controls used in our 
difference-in-difference analysis as well as industry and year fixed effects as determinants. We 
then match firms in IFRS countries with those in non-IFRS countries using the caliper technique 
(with replacement) with a radius of 0.01. This procedure is consistent with prior literature 
(DeFond, Hung, Li, and Li 2015). We use the matched group of non-IFRS adopters as the second 
control group. This approach generates a control sample of 20,292 firm-year observations.  
The third control sample includes firms from IFRS-mandating countries that voluntarily 
adopted IFRS prior to 2005. Because these firms already reported under IFRS and experienced 
various capital-market benefits (Ashbaugh and Pincus 2001; Barth et al. 2008; Covrig et al. 
2007), they should be less affected or unaffected by the mandatory adoption in 2005. Using firms 
from the same countries as controls could also mitigate the concern about different data coverage 
across IFRS and non-IFRS countries. We identify a firm as a voluntary adopter if it is located in 
an IFRS-mandating country and adopted IFRS or IAS before the mandatory adoption date. We 
exclude the years before a voluntary adopter adopted IFRS. This approach generates a control 
sample of 4,064 firm-year observations. As discussed in DeFond et al. (2015), each of these 
control samples has its advantages and disadvantages. Therefore, our conclusion is based on the 
collective results using all three control groups in our difference-in-difference analysis. To 
conserve space, we present our subsequent results using only the first control group, but we 
obtain robust results using the other two control groups.    
Table 1 presents the sample distribution by country and by the calendar year of the 
forecast date. Panel A suggests that large economies, such as the UK, Australia, and France, 
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dominate the treatment sample, while the US and Japan dominate the control group. 11 This 
sample distribution is generally consistent with prior literature (Landsman et al. 2012; DeFond et 
al. 2015). Panel B indicates that our sample is roughly evenly distributed across the sample 
period. We also observe from this panel that the likelihood and frequency of management 
forecasts are much lower at the beginning of our sample period (2002-2003) for both IFRS and 
non-IFRS countries, likely due to smaller coverage of Capital IQ in early years. However, to the 
extent that the coverage issue exists for both the treatment and control groups, it should not 
affect our difference-in-difference results. Nevertheless, we conduct a series of robustness 
checks, including limiting our sample period to 2004-2010, restricting the analysis to firm-years 
with at least one forecast, and restricting the sample to firms that were forecasters in the pre-
adoption period. We find consistent results throughout these checks (reported in Internet 
Appendix).    
 
IV. PRIMARY EMPIRICAL RESEARCH DESIGN AND RESULTS 
Average Effects of IFRS on Management Forecasts 
To test H1, we employ a difference-in-difference method to evaluate the average effects 
of mandatory IFRS adoption on voluntary disclosure. Our basic research design entails 
estimating the following equation:          
            DISC = β1Post_IFRS + Firm Controls + Country F. E. + Year F. E. + Industry F. E.   (1) 
The dependent variable DISC represents a measure of voluntary disclosure. We use two variables, 
Issue and Freq, to measure the level of voluntary disclosure. Issue is a dummy variable defined 
as one if a firm issues at least one management forecast in a given year. Freq is a count variable 
                                                          
11 Although Swiss firms were allowed to use US GAAP instead of IFRS during our sample period, we classify 
Switzerland as an IFRS-mandating country to be consistent with prior literature. However, our results are almost 
identical if we exclude the relatively small number of Swiss firms from our sample (unreported).  
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measuring the total number of management forecasts issued in a given year. We also separately 
count the number of new forecasts Freq(New), forecast revisions Freq(Revision), and forecast 
confirmations (Confirm). We provide a detailed description and analysis for the different forecast 
types in the Internet Appendix. Both Issue and Freq are set to zero for firm-years without any 
management forecasts. We use a logit (Poisson) model when using Issue (Freq) as the dependent 
variable.12 Post_IFRS is a dummy variable equal to one for firms in IFRS-mandating countries 
with fiscal years ending in or after December 2005. A positive (negative) β1 indicates an average 
increase (decrease) in management forecasts after mandatory IFRS adoption. We cluster standard 
errors by country to correct for potential correlations among firms within the same country.  
We control for various firm-level variables that could potentially influence firms’ 
decisions for management forecasts, including Size (the natural logarithm of the market value of 
equity), ROA (net income divided by total assets), BTM (book value of equity divided by market 
value of equity), Leverage (long-term debt divided by total assets), EarnVol (standard deviation 
of earnings divided by total assets for the past five years, with a minimum of three years’ data 
required), RetVol (standard deviation of annual buy-and-hold stock returns over the past five 
years, with a minimum of three years’ data required), the number of analysts following 
(Analysts), and shares owned by foreign institutions as a percentage of total shares outstanding 
(Inst).  
We expect larger firms and firms with greater financing needs to be more transparent. 
The association between management forecasts and the book-to-market ratio, earnings volatility, 
and stock return volatility is ambiguous. On the one hand, due to high uncertainty, managers of 
firms with higher growth rates or higher volatility may be endowed with less information and, 
therefore, issue fewer management forecasts. On the other hand, because high-growth and more 
                                                          
12 Our conclusions remain unchanged if we use OLS and the natural logarithm of 1+Freq as the dependent variable. 
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volatile firms often face higher information asymmetry, investors may demand more voluntary 
disclosure (Waymire 1985). Because firms often issue forecasts in response to analysts’ and 
institutional investors’ requests, we expect a positive association between management forecasts 
and analyst coverage and foreign institutional ownership (Lang and Lundholm 1996; Bhojraj, 
Blacconiere, and D’Souza 2004; Ajinkya et al. 2005). All the above firm controls are measured 
in the year preceding the forecast date. We also control for bad news (BadNews) by including a 
dummy variable defined as one if the firm experienced a negative change in earnings during the 
forecasting year, and zero otherwise. Firms may voluntarily disclose bad news early to avoid 
shareholder litigation (Skinner 1994), but they may also prefer to delay bad news until the 
earnings announcements (Roychowdhury and Sletten 2012). We also control for subsequent 
equity issuance (EquityIssue) by including a dummy variable defined as one if the number of 
common shares outstanding adjusted for stock splits and dividends increases by 20 percent or 
more in the subsequent year because firms may increase voluntary disclosure before accessing 
the equity market to reduce their cost of capital (Frankel, McNichols, and Wilson 1995; Francis 
et al. 2008). The ADR indicator is set to one if the firm has ADR traded in the US, and we expect 
ADR firms to face higher demand for disclosure from investors.  
During our sample period, some of our IFRS-adopting countries increased their financial 
reporting frequency from semi-annual to quarterly reporting, which could have a positive impact 
on management forecast frequency, especially on the forecasts of interim earnings. Thus, we 
include a variable for reporting frequency (Interim) in the year of forecasting to control for this 
effect. 13  We convert all non-ratio variables into US dollars using the exchange rate at the 
corresponding fiscal year end. To mitigate the potential impact of outliers, we winsorize all 
continuous variables at 1 and 99 percentage levels. We also include fixed effects for country and 
                                                          
13 We further address this issue in the robustness analysis section of the Internet Appendix. 
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year to control for unobserved country-specific and year-specific factors. We include industry 
fixed effects (2-digit SIC), as prior studies suggest that industry characteristics could affect firms’ 
management forecast decisions (Li 2010; Ali, Klasa, and Yeung 2014).  
Table 1, Panel A reports the average likelihood (Issue) and frequency of management 
forecasts (Freq) for each sample country. We observe large cross-country variation: the average 
forecast frequency ranges from 0.24 (South Africa) to 1.71 (Luxembourg) among IFRS countries, 
and it ranges from 0 (Peru) to 1.96 (United States) among non-IFRS countries. Panel B reports 
the average forecast likelihood and frequency by calendar year of the forecast date for IFRS and 
non-IFRS countries, respectively. We observe a large increase in forecasts in 2004 for both IFRS 
and non-IFRS countries. This could be a result of the increased popularity of management 
guidance around the world and/or the expanded coverage by Capital IQ, which underscores the 
importance of employing a difference-in-difference research design. We observe another 
increase in forecasts in 2005 and 2006 for IFRS countries, but not non-IFRS countries, consistent 
with the mandatory IFRS adoption in 2005 being associated with more management forecasts.  
[Insert Table 1] 
Table 2 reports summary statistics of regression variables in the pre- and post-IFRS 
adoption periods for all firms in IFRS and non-IFRS countries, along with differences in means 
between pre- and post-IFRS adoption. For firms in IFRS countries, 47 percent issued 
management forecasts during the post-adoption period relative to 14 percent during the pre-
adoption period, and the average forecast frequency increased by 0.72. For firms in non-IFRS 
countries, we also observe an increase in forecast likelihood and frequency but with smaller 
magnitudes. The mean difference-in-difference values for Issue (Freq) is 0.27 (0.63), with a t-
statistic of 37.13 (30.21), suggesting that firms in IFRS-adoption countries are 27 percent more 
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likely to issue management forecasts (issue 0.63 more management forecasts) post-adoption 
relative to firms in non-IFRS countries. These findings provide some preliminary evidence 
consistent with a positive effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on management forecasts. We also 
observe that firms in IFRS countries experience larger increases in size, leverage, return 
volatility, analyst coverage, foreign institutional ownership, and interim reporting frequency in 
the post-adoption period relative to the control group.  
[Insert Table 2] 
Table 3 presents the difference-in-difference regression results. Columns (1) and (2) 
report the results using the first control group, i.e., all firms in non-IFRS countries. The 
coefficients on Post_IFRS are positive and significant in both regressions. The coefficient of 
1.550 (1.221) on Post_IFRS in the regression on Issue (Freq) suggests a marginal effect of 0.356 
(1.149), i.e., firms in IFRS countries are 36 percent more likely to issue management forecasts 
(issue 1.15 more forecasts) in the post-adoption period than those in non-IFRS countries. The 
coefficients on the firm controls are generally consistent with prior literature. Positive 
coefficients on Size, ROA, BTM, and Leverage suggest that large, well-performing, mature, and 
highly levered firms issue more forecasts, while negative coefficients on EarnVol and BadNews 
suggest that firms facing high uncertainty and bad news are more reluctant to forecast. Positive 
coefficients on Analysts and Inst are consistent with management disclosing more to meet 
demand from analysts and shareholders. We also find that ADR firms and firms with higher 
interim reporting frequency issue more forecasts. We observe a negative coefficient on 
subsequent equity issuance, but it is only significant for the regression on Issue.14  
Columns (3) and (4) report the regression results using the second control group, i.e., the 
propensity-score-matched firms in non-IFRS countries. Despite the smaller sample size, the 
                                                          
14 The negative coefficient on subsequent equity issuance is also consistent with that in Francis et al. (2008).  
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coefficients on Post_IFRS continue to be positive and significant across both model 
specifications. Some control variables lose their significance, possibly due to the matching 
procedure in the first step.   
Columns (5) and (6) report the regression results using the third control group, i.e., 
voluntary adopters in IFRS countries. Because this analysis only uses firms in IFRS countries, 
the sample size is further reduced. We replace the variable Post_IFRS in Equation (1) with a 
Post_Mandatory indicator defined as one for mandatory adopters with fiscal years ending in or 
after December 2005 and a firm-level Mandatory indicator defined as one for mandatory 
adopters and zero for voluntary adopters. We continue to find the coefficients on 
Post_Mandatory to be positive and significant across both model specifications, suggesting that 
relative to voluntary adopters within the same countries, mandatory adopters issue more 
management forecasts after the mandate. The negative coefficients on Mandatory suggest that 
voluntary adopters issue more management forecasts than local GAAP users during the pre-
mandatory adoption period. Given that prior literature documents increased capital-market 
demand associated with voluntary IAS adoption (Ashbaugh and Pincus 2001; Barth et al. 2008; 
Covrig et al. 2007; Daske et al. 2013), this finding is also consistent with our argument that 
changes in firms’ capital-market incentives following IFRS adoption lead to more voluntary 
disclosure. Interestingly, we find that the sum of coefficients on Post_Mandatory and Mandatory 
are negative and significant in both regressions, suggesting that mandatory IFRS adoption does 
not fully eliminate the disclosure gap between voluntary and mandatory adopters, perhaps 
because voluntary adopters still face relatively higher disclosure incentives than mandatory 
adopters even in post-adoption period. This is in line with the finding in Muller, Riedl, and 
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Sellhorn (2011) that differences in information asymmetry remain between mandatory and 
voluntary adopters even after all firms are required to adopt IFRS.15 
We conduct a battery of robustness analyses addressing the concerns of changes in 
mandatory reporting frequency, and in sample composition that could potentially drive our 
results. We also conduct a country-level analysis. We obtain robust results across all these 
alternative specifications. To conserve space, we report and discuss these results in the Internet 
Appendix. 
In summary, the results in this section suggest that both the likelihood and frequency of 
management forecasts increase significantly following mandatory IFRS adoption, i.e., an average 
positive effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on voluntary disclosure. 
[Insert Table 3] 
Legal Origin and IFRS Adoption Effects 
To test H2, i.e. the differential effects of IFRS adoption on common-law and code-law 
countries, we re-estimate Equation (1), including all controls but allowing the coefficients on 
Post_IFRS to differ between common-law and code-law countries. The results using all firms in 
non-IFRS countries as the control group are reported in Table 4, Columns (1) and (2). We 
observe that both common-law and code-law IFRS countries issue more management forecasts 
(in terms of both forecasting likelihood and frequency) post-IFRS adoption relative to the control 
group. More importantly, the χ2-test results suggest that the coefficient on Post_IFRS is 
significantly larger for the code-law group than the common-law group in the regression on 
forecast frequency. This finding suggests that voluntary disclosure increases after IFRS adoption, 
especially among code-law countries. In Columns (3) and (4), we test whether there is a 
“catching-up” effect in disclosure levels between code-law and common-law countries. To 
                                                          
15 We thank one of the reviewers for providing this interpretation.  
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compare these disclosure levels during the pre-adoption period, we include two separate 
indicators, IFRSCommon and IFRSCode, and we omit country fixed effects from the regressions. The 
negative coefficients on both indicators suggest lower disclosure levels during the pre-adoption 
period for both common-law and code-law countries in the treatment group relative to the control 
group. We also find the coefficient on IFRS is marginally more negative for code-law countries 
than common-law countries, suggesting that the former group issued fewer management 
forecasts than the latter during the pre-adoption period. This is in line with the finding in Ball et 
al. (2000) that the financial reporting quality was lower in code-law countries during late 1980s 
and early 1990s, a period before IFRS was mandated. In addition, the larger coefficient on 
Post_IFRS for code-law countries and the similar coefficients on IFRS+Post_IFRS for code-law 
and common-law countries suggest a “catching-up effect” in disclosure levels among code-law 
countries, i.e., the differences in disclosure levels between these two groups were fully 
eliminated after IFRS adoption.  
[Insert Table 4] 
The above analysis uses a simple dichotomous classification based on legal origin. As 
discussed in Section II, the major reason firms face different disclosure incentives in common-
law and code-law countries is their different governance models, i.e., shareholder vs. stakeholder. 
Therefore, we conduct a further analysis on the role of equity markets and other stakeholders, 
including government, labor unions, and lenders. We find some weak evidence suggesting that 
firms located in countries featuring high government involvement and small equity markets issue 
incrementally more management forecasts following IFRS adoption. These findings are again 
consistent with a catching-up effect among firms facing low capital-market incentives for 
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disclosure pre-adoption. To conserve space, we report and discuss these analyses and results in 
the Internet Appendix.  
 
Channels for Changes in Disclosure Incentives  
Our hypotheses predict that firms with greater improvements in earnings quality and 
increases in shareholder and analyst demand will experience larger increases in management 
forecasts following IFRS adoption, especially among code-law countries. To create a firm-year 
measure for earnings quality, we follow prior literature and use the cross-sectional modified 
Jones (1991) model.16  We multiply discretionary accruals by -1 so that higher values indicate 
better earnings quality. We measure investor demand as the percentage of foreign institutional 
ownership, as prior studies find that foreign, rather than domestic, institutions appear to have 
higher demand for corporate governance (Ferreira and Matos 2008; Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira, and 
Matos 2011).17 In addition, both Covrig et al. (2007) and DeFond et al. (2011) find that IFRS 
adoption attracts more foreign mutual funds. We follow the approach in Ferreira and Matos 
(2008) and classify institutions into foreign and domestic and define foreign institutional 
ownership as the sum of the holdings of all institutions domiciled in a country different from the 
country where the stock is issued as a percentage of market capitalization. We measure analyst 
                                                          
16 To calculate discretionary accruals for each firm-year, we estimate the following Jones (1991) model using firms 
from the same country, industry (2-digit SIC), and year: 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑡−1
= 𝛼1 1𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛼2 ∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑡−1+𝛼3 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑡−1. We require 
at least 20 observations to estimate the above equation. We then use the country-, industry-, and year-specific 
parameter estimates obtained from the equation to calculate the firm-year specific discretional accruals as a 
percentage of lagged total assets as 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑡−1
− (𝛼�1 1𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛼�2 ∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡−∆𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛼�3 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑡−1), where 𝛼�1 , 𝛼�2 , 
and 𝛼�3are estimated coefficients for each country, industry, and year, respectively. This approach is similar to that in 
Pincus, Rajgobal, and Venkatachalam (2007), who use the scaled-decile rank of discretionary accruals estimated 
from the Jones (1991) model to measure earnings management. We obtain similar results if we use the absolute 
value of discretionary accruals or use the signed total accruals. Other international studies examining earnings 
quality use other measures, such as the correlation between accruals and cash flows and the variability of the 
changes in earnings (Barth et al. 2008). However, these measures can only be calculated at the aggregate level, not 
at the firm level.   
17 We obtain very similar results if we use total institutional ownership (unreported).   
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demand as the number of analysts following, as both Tan et al. (2011) and Byard et al. (2011) 
find that IFRS adoption attracts more analysts. These three channels capture different aspects of 
changes in firms’ disclosure incentives.  
The above three measures are calculated at the firm-year level. To construct the firm-
level changes in disclosure incentives, we estimate the average of each measure for the post-
adoption period (2005-2010) and the pre-adoption period (2002-2004) separately and then use 
the post- and pre-adoption difference to measure the firm-level changes. Using the firm-level 
average could reduce measurement errors and account for the possibility that these changes 
happened slowly over time. This step implicitly requires each firm to exist in both pre- and post-
adoption periods.  
We use the following equation to test the argument that changes in firm-level disclosure 
incentives after IFRS adoption lead to more management forecasts:  
DISC = β1Post_IFRS + β2Post_IFRS×ΔIncentive  
          + Firm Controls + Country F. E. + Year F. E. + Industry F. E.                   (2) 
where ΔIncentive is an indicator variable defined as one if the firm experiences above-median 
changes in disclosure incentives. 18  The sample median is calculated using changes in 
discretionary accruals, changes in foreign institutional ownership, or changes in analyst coverage 
among all treatment firms that exist in both pre- and post-adoption periods. Other variables are 
defined in the same way as in Equation (1). We expect a positive coefficient on β2, which 
measures the incremental increase in management forecasts among firms experiencing a larger 
improvement in disclosure incentives within IFRS-adopting countries. To test the differential 
interaction effects of changes in disclosure incentives in common-law and code-law countries, 
                                                          
18 The main effect of ΔIncentive is omitted because it cannot be measured for control firms, and we are interested in 
variation within the treatment group. Therefore, β2 captures the incremental effect of IFRS adoption for firms with 
high disclosure incentives relative to those with low disclosure incentives within the treatment group.    
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we re-estimate Equation (2) by allowing the coefficients on Post_IFRS to differ between 
common-law and code-law countries. The regression results on forecast frequency are reported 
in Table 5. Columns (1) and (2) report the results using earnings quality to measure disclosure 
incentives.   
We observe positive and significant coefficients on Post_IFRS×ΔIncentive, 
Post_IFRSCommon×ΔIncentive, and Post_IFRSCode×ΔIncentive, suggesting that firms experiencing 
larger improvements in earnings quality issue more management forecasts after IFRS adoption in 
both common-law and code-law countries. This finding is consistent with the complementarity 
between mandatory and voluntary disclosure documented in the US setting (Francis et al. 2008). 
Columns (3) to (6) report the results using institutional ownership and analyst coverage as 
measures for disclosure incentives. We find the coefficient on Post_IFRS×ΔIncentive to be 
positive and significant only for code-law countries, consistent with the argument that code-law 
firms issue more management forecasts after IFRS adoption in response to higher demand from 
institutional investors and analysts. The finding that institutional investors and analysts do not 
seem to play an incremental role in encouraging management forecasts in common-law countries 
could be due to these firms already facing high capital-market demand during the pre-adoption 
period. When we put all three measures for disclosure incentives into one regression and run a 
horserace, we find similar results (unreported), suggesting that these three channels capture 
different aspects of changes in firm-level disclosure incentives.  
[Insert Table 5] 
In summary, the findings in this section suggest that mandatory IFRS adoption has 
increased firms’ disclosure incentives through increased earnings quality and shareholder and 
analyst demand, leading to more management forecasts. 
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V. ADDITIONAL ANALYSES 
In this section, we conduct additional analyses to explore 1) other potential channels 
through which IFRS adoption could affect management forecasts and 2) the cross-sectional 
variation of the adoption effect based on GAAP differences and enforcement strengths.   
Other Potential Channels 
Relative to prior domestic GAAP in many countries, IFRS is often referred to by 
accounting practitioners and academics as “principles-based”, as it provides a broad set of 
principles that are subject to managerial interpretation and judgment. Therefore, firms may face 
higher litigation risk transitioning from rules-based to principles-based standards (Donelson, 
McInnis, and Mergenthaler 2012). In addition, “fair-value oriented” IFRS requires more timely 
recognition of fair-value asset losses and impairments. This could help outside investors know 
more precisely and in a timelier fashion what information managers possess, thereby increasing 
managers’ litigation risk of withholding bad news.19 Prior literature has identified litigation risk 
as an important determinant of voluntary disclosure, especially the disclosure of bad news 
(Skinner 1994). Therefore, we expect heightened litigation risk following mandatory IFRS 
adoption to lead to more voluntary disclosure. However, heighted litigation risk may also create 
obstacles to more voluntary disclosure, as concerns about potential lawsuits arising from 
inaccurate disclosure may discourage managers from issuing earnings forecasts. For example, 
Baginski et al. (2002) find that US firms issue fewer good-news and long-term forecasts than 
                                                          
19 For instance, in a pre-IFRS regime, upon receiving a private signal of a significant decline in asset value, 
managers could withhold bad news and then profit from selling firm shares. They would face relatively low 
litigation risk, as investors would be unaware of the bad news until several quarters later when impairments (if any) 
are recorded. In an IFRS regime, where the decline in asset value is immediately reflected in financial statements as 
fair-value losses or impairments, managers who withhold bad news and sell shares in the same quarter would face 
high litigation risk. 
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Canadian firms due to fear of shareholder litigation. Therefore, whether IFRS adoption increases 
litigation risk, which in turn leads to more management forecasts, is an empirical question.20 
We empirically assess heightened litigation risk as a potential channel for more voluntary 
disclosure. It is empirically difficult to measure the level of litigation risk anticipated by 
managers over time. However, we expect that firms operating in riskier industries are more likely 
to be affected by heightened litigation risk following IFRS adoption. Following prior literature, 
we identify risky industries as those with SIC codes within 2833-2936, 3570-3577, 7370-7374, 
3600-3674, 5200-5961, or 8731-8734. 21  We test this prediction by replacing ΔIncentive in 
Equation (2) with an industry-level indicator variable defined as one for firms operating in a 
risky industry. We do not include the indicator variable itself in the regression, as it is subsumed 
by industry fixed effects. We continue to impose the requirement that each firm exists in both 
pre- and post-adoption periods to ensure that we have the same set of firms as those examined in 
Table 5. Table 6, Columns (1) and (2), report the results on forecast frequency. We observe a 
negative and significant coefficient on the interaction term for the whole sample as well as for 
both common-law and code-law countries. This finding suggests that firms in risky industries 
issue incrementally fewer management forecasts than those in other industries following IFRS 
adoption, inconsistent with the argument that heightened litigation risk under an IFRS regime 
leads to more voluntary disclosure. 
The second potential channel for increased management forecasts following IFRS 
adoption is the increased supply of forward-looking information. Under “fair-value”-oriented 
                                                          
20 The argument that IFRS increases litigation risk implicitly assumes that the disclosure requirements under IFRS 
are properly enforced and that managers are held accountable for withholding bad news. We discuss the role of 
enforcement later in this section.   
21 We acknowledge that this industry-based definition of litigation risk follows prior literature that mainly uses US 
firms as the setting. This could be a noisy measure for litigation risk in our setting of international firms, as these 
industries could face different regulatory and litigious environments outside the US. Nevertheless, the noise in the 
measure should work against us finding any significant results.   
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IFRS rules, managers are required to evaluate the current fair values of assets and liabilities, 
most of which are determined using forward-looking price/earnings multiples or other 
discounted cash flow models. Therefore, to comply with fair value rules under IFRS, managers 
have to collect forward-looking information and make projections about firms’ future prospects, 
which reduces the marginal cost of producing forecasts for future earnings. Holding the 
disclosure incentive constant, given that managers already possess such information under an 
IFRS regime, they are more likely to disclose it. Because fair value accounting is more prevalent 
among financial firms that possess a large amount of financial assets and liabilities recognized 
under fair values, this argument predicts that financial firms should experience a larger increase 
in management forecasts than non-financial firms following IFRS adoption. Because our original 
sample excludes financial firms (SIC 6000-6999), we now add them back and examine whether 
IFRS adoption has a differential effect on financial and non-financial firms. We test this 
prediction by replacing ΔIncentive in Equation (2) with an industry-level indicator variable 
defined as one for firms operating in a financial industry.  
The results reported in Table 6, Columns (3) and (4), suggest a similar increase in 
management forecasts for financial and non-financial firms after IFRS adoption, inconsistent 
with the argument that increased supply of forward-looking information leads to more voluntary 
disclosure. 
 Another potential explanation is increased peer pressure. After the mandatory adoption, 
firms in IFRS countries comply with a set of uniform accounting standards. The increased 
uniformity across countries may generate more peer pressure for disclosure. This argument 
predicts that firms facing a larger increase in peer pressure issue more forecasts following IFRS 
adoption. We use the industry uniformity measure developed in DeFond et al. (2011) to measure 
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peer pressure. Industry uniformity is defined as the number of firms within the same industry that 
use the same accounting standards. To calculate the change in uniformity, we average across the 
post-adoption period (2005-2010) and the pre-adoption period (2002-2004) and calculate the 
difference. We test this prediction by re-estimating Equation (2), where ΔIncentive is defined as 
one for firms operating in industries experiencing an above-median change in uniformity. Table 
6, Columns (5) and (6), report the regression results. Inconsistent with the argument that 
increased industry peer pressure drives the increase in management forecasts, the coefficients on 
Post_IFRS× ΔIncentive are insignificant in both regressions.  
[Insert Table 6] 
Another potential explanation for more management forecasts following IFRS adoption is 
the higher uncertainty about future earnings during the transitional period immediately following 
the adoption. This may result in firms issuing more management forecasts to resolve this 
increase in uncertainty. This argument has two predictions: 1) the increase in management 
forecasts is larger among firms experiencing a larger increase in earnings volatility, and 2) the 
increase in management forecasts will be short-lived. To test the first prediction, we re-estimate 
Equation (2) by redefining ΔIncentive as one for firms experiencing above-median changes in 
earnings volatility in the post-adoption period. The results are reported in Table 6, Columns (7) 
and (8). Inconsistent with the explanation that the increase in management forecasts is caused by 
an increase in earnings volatility, we find the coefficient on Post_IFRS×ΔIncentive to be 
insignificant in both regressions.  
To test the second prediction, we examine an alternative specification in which we allow 
the coefficient on Post_IFRS in Equation (1) to differ across different years after the adoption 
date. Under the alternative story, we expect only Post_IFRS2005 to be positive and significant. 
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The results as reported in Table 7, Columns (1) and (2), suggest that management forecasts start 
to increase immediately after the adoption in 2005 and increase further in the following years 
until 2010. This evidence is inconsistent with the story of a transitory effect. However, one may 
argue that management forecasts are sticky over time and that firms that provided forecasts 
before are more likely to do so again in the future. Therefore, even if IFRS adoption only has a 
transitory effect on management forecasts, the sticky disclosure behavior could make the effect 
seem non-transitory. To further examine this possibility, we analyze firms’ tendency to increase 
forecast frequency.  
The results are presented in Table 7, Columns (3) and (4). The dependent variable 
Increase is an indicator variable defined as one if forecast frequency increases from the previous 
year, and zero otherwise. The stickiness part of firms’ forecasting behavior is therefore removed 
when we use Increase as the dependent variable. The positive and significant coefficients on 
Post_IFRS and the individual yearly indicators suggest that firms have higher tendency to 
increase forecast frequency after IFRS adoption, again inconsistent with a transitory effect.22  
[Insert Table 7] 
 
An alternative explanation for more management forecasts following IFRS adoption is 
the higher flexibility to manipulate earnings, which gives managers a better opportunity to 
smooth earnings and meet their own forecasts.23 We provide two pieces of evidence inconsistent 
with this explanation. First, we observe more frequent forecast revisions post-IFRS adoption 
(reported in the Internet Appendix, Table IA2), inconsistent with the conjecture that earnings 
become easier to forecast under IFRS. Second, when we consider whether the increase in 
                                                          
22 It is possible that firms affected by the financial crisis of 2008-2009 also provided more disclosure to reduce 
investor uncertainty.  
23 A few studies document increased earnings smoothing following mandatory IFRS adoption (Ahmed, Neel, and 
Wang 2013; Capkum, Collins, and Jeanjean 2013).  
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management forecasts is primarily driven by mandatory adopters with more opportunities to 
manipulate earnings, such as firms with larger abnormal accruals, we do not find any evidence in 
support of this claim. Instead, the results in Table 5, Columns (1) and (2), suggest that firms with 
greater increases in abnormal accruals (or smaller increases in earnings quality) in the post-
adoption period actually issue fewer management forecasts. 
Based on the analyses in this section, we fail to find evidence supporting the alternative 
channels, such as heightened litigation risk, higher supply of forward-looking information, 
increased peer pressure, higher uncertainty for future earnings, and increased earnings 
management, through which mandatory IFRS adoption leads to more management forecasts. 
   
The Difference between IFRS and Prior Domestic GAAP  
If the observed increase in management forecasts is caused by mandatory IFRS adoption, 
the increase should be positively associated with the degree to which IFRS alters a country’s 
accounting standards. To test this implication, we re-estimate Equation (2) by replacing 
ΔIncentive with two country-level indexes: BaeScore and BaeAcct. Both indexes are constructed 
from item scores obtained from Bae, Tan, and Welker (2008, Table 1), who list 21 key 
accounting variables based on the Nobes (2001) GAAP 2001 Survey and assign a score of one for 
each item that does not conform to IAS. BaeScore is the sum of the 21 items (or variable 
gaapdiff1 in Bae et al. 2008) and measures the aggregate difference between local GAAP and 
IFRS. BaeAcct is the sum of scores on items that directly affect financial statement numbers, as 
we are primarily interested in the extent to which IFRS alters firms’ mandatory reporting 
numbers.24 Table 1, Panel C, reports values for these two variables for our treatment countries. 
We conduct this analysis for IFRS-adopting countries only, and therefore, the variable 
                                                          
24 See Ball, Li, and Shivakumar (2015) for a detailed definition of the BaeAcct index.    
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Post_IFRS is subsumed by fixed effects. Regression results are reported in Table 8, Columns (1) 
to (4). The positive coefficient on Post_IFRS×Index across all model specifications suggests that 
the increase in management forecasts in the post-adoption period is positively associated with the 
differences between prior domestic GAAP and IFRS.  
[Insert Table 8] 
Enforcement and IFRS Adoption Effects 
Prior literature suggests that a mere adoption of different accounting standards does not 
appear to improve financial transparency unless combined with effective enforcement (Ball 2001; 
Ball et al. 2003). Consistent with this view, prior studies document an important role of legal 
enforcement in determining the effects of IFRS adoption on capital markets and information 
environment.25 To examine the role of enforcement in our setting, we re-estimate Equation (2) 
by using the rule of law index (Enforcement) as the conditioning variable. The rule of law index 
for our sample countries measured in 2005 is obtained from Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 
(2009) and is reported in Table 1, Panel C. Table 8, Columns (5) and (6), report the regression 
results. Again, because this analysis is conducted for IFRS-adopting countries only, the variable 
Post_IFRS is subsumed by fixed effects. The coefficient on Post_IFRS×Index is insignificant in 
both models.  
Christensen, Hail, and Leuz (2013) find that the equity market effects around IFRS 
adoption are confined to a small number of EU countries that concurrently enhanced 
enforcement. To evaluate whether our results are driven by concurrent enforcement changes, we 
conduct the following analyses: (1) we exclude EU countries with concurrent enforcement 
                                                          
25 For example, Daske et al. (2008) find that the capital-market benefits of IFRS only exist in countries with strong 
enforcement; Byard et al. (2011) find that IFRS adoption only improves analysts’ information environment in 
countries with both strong enforcement and domestic accounting standards that differ significantly from IFRS; and 
Landsman et al. (2012) find that the improvement in the information content of earnings after IFRS adoption is 
greater in countries with stronger legal enforcement.  
31 
 
changes from our treatment sample; (2) we re-estimate Equation (1) by allowing the coefficient 
on Post_IFRS to vary across EU and non-EU countries; and (3) we allow the coefficient on 
Post_IFRS to vary within EU countries based on whether the country had concurrent 
enforcement changes. Table 1, Panel C, reports the classification of IFRS countries into EU 
countries with and without concurrent enforcement changes. Table 8, Columns (7) to (12), report 
the results. We find that the coefficients on Post_IFRS continue to be positive and significant 
after excluding EU countries with concurrent enforcement changes. We also find the results to 
hold for both EU and non-EU countries, as well as for EU countries with and without concurrent 
enforcements. In particular, we find that the coefficients on Post_IFRS have similar magnitudes 
for EU and non-EU groups and even larger magnitudes for EU countries without concurrent 
enforcement changes. These findings suggest that our results are not restricted to the sample of 
EU countries or those with concurrent enforcement changes.   
Based on the analysis in this section, we fail to find evidence supporting the argument 
that enforcement drives the increase in management forecasts after IFRS adoption.  
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we document a significant increase in the likelihood and frequency of 
management forecasts after mandatory IFRS adoption in 2005. We find the increase to be larger 
among code-law than common-law countries, suggesting a catching-up effect in voluntary 
disclosure after the adoption among countries that initially faced low demand for disclosure from 
capital markets. We propose and test three channels through which IFRS adoption could alter 
firms’ disclosure incentives in response to increased capital-market demand: improved earnings 
quality, increased shareholder demand, and increased analyst demand. We find evidence 
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consistent with all three channels, especially among code-law countries. Finally, we find the 
effects to be positively associated with the difference between adopting-countries’ prior local 
GAAP and IFRS but not with concurrent changes in enforcement.  
We contribute to the literature by examining the effect of IFRS adoption on management 
forecasts, a previously unexplored area. We complement prior literature that examines the 
relation between mandatory reporting and voluntary disclosure within the US. Our finding that 
voluntary disclosure increases following improvements in mandatory reporting, especially in 
code-law countries, based on our analysis of the mandated IFRS adoption provides an economic 
rationale for an expectation that firms’ disclosure incentives could change with changes in 
mandatory accounting standards. 
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Table 1: Sample Composition and Institutional Variables 
Panel A reports the number of firm-years and management forecast variables averaged by country. Panel B reports 
the number of firm-years and management forecast variables averaged by calendar year of forecast date. Issue is an 
indicator variable equal to one if a firm issued at least one management forecast in a certain year, and zero otherwise. 
Freq is the number of forecasts issued by a firm in a certain year. Panel C reports the legal origin, i.e., common-law 
versus code-law, and institutional variables for IFRS countries. The difference between local GAAP and IFRS 
(BaeScore) is based on Bae et al.’s (2008) summary score (gaapdiff1) of how domestic GAAP differs from IAS on 
21 key accounting dimensions. BaeAcct is the sum of scores on items that directly affect financial statement 
numbers. Legal enforcement is based on the rule of law index (Enforcement) for the year 2005 from Kaufmann et al. 
(2009). Indicator variables designate European Union countries (EU), European Union countries with IFRS adoption 
bundled with substantive change in enforcement (EU_ENF), and European Union countries having no enforcement 
changes concurrent with IFRS adoption (EU_nonENF). These classifications are based on Christensen et al. (2013).  
Panel A: Sample composition by country 
                
Country N Issue Freq Country N Issue Freq 
IFRS countries Non-IFRS countries 
Australia 2,590 0.41 0.79 Argentina 34 0.15 0.15 
Austria 112 0.42 0.90 Canada 2,525 0.27 0.48 
Belgium 386 0.35 0.68 Colombia 36 0.17 0.19 
Czech Republic 19 0.16 0.63 Egypt 46 0.15 0.17 
Denmark 597 0.56 1.61 India 1,308 0.22 0.32 
Germany 1,174 0.57 1.47 Indonesia 687 0.27 0.38 
Finland 761 0.56 1.33 Japan 23,431 0.48 1.31 
France 2,142 0.36 0.72 Jordan 5 0.20 0.20 
Greece 341 0.24 0.33 Korea 608 0.31 0.44 
Hong Kong 480 0.26 0.34 Malaysia 2,934 0.16 0.20 
Hungary 18 0.33 0.33 Mexico 195 0.26 0.48 
Iceland 11 0.36 0.73 Peru 7 0.00 0.00 
Ireland 217 0.42 0.99 Russia 107 0.42 0.83 
Italy 1,029 0.37 0.65 Taiwan 739 0.25 0.39 
Luxembourg 21 0.62 1.71 Thailand 1,388 0.40 0.70 
Netherlands 627 0.47 0.86 United States 26,515 0.60 1.96 
Norway 623 0.21 0.31 Zimbabwe 20 0.15 0.20 
Philippines 90 0.26 0.66      
Poland 516 0.28 0.53      
Portugal 192 0.28 0.34      
South Africa 972 0.21 0.24      
Spain 551 0.34 0.50      
Sweden 990 0.24 0.40      
Switzerland 300 0.28 0.44      
United Kingdom 5,525 0.29 0.42      
Venezuela 8 0.25 0.25         
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Panel B: Sample composition by year 
        Year N Issue Freq Year N Issue Freq 
IFRS countries Non-IFRS countries 
2002 1,940 0.011 0.014 2002 5,923 0.234 0.533 
2003 2,113 0.013 0.017 2003 6,248 0.217 0.441 
2004 2,247 0.259 0.357 2004 6,497 0.689 2.497 
2005 2,197 0.365 0.602 2005 6,748 0.692 2.067 
2006 1,809 0.473 0.857 2006 6,920 0.629 1.505 
2007 2,042 0.458 0.851 2007 7,054 0.444 1.258 
2008 2,299 0.436 0.873 2008 7,154 0.538 1.653 
2009 2,783 0.447 0.876 2009 7,075 0.462 1.368 
2010 2,862 0.564 1.203 2010 6,966 0.486 1.423 
Total 20,292     Total 60,585     
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Panel C: Institutional variables 
                
Country Legal Regime BaeScore BaeAcct Enforcement EU EU_ENF EU_nonENF 
 IFRS countries 
Australia Common 4 3 1.71 0 0 0 
Austria Code 12 6 1.86 1 0 1 
Belgium Code 13 8 1.24 1 0 1 
Czech Republic Code 14 9 0.86 1 0 1 
Denmark Code 11 7 1.95 1 0 1 
Germany Code 15 8 1.96 1 1 0 
Finland Code 12 8 1.40 1 1 0 
France Code 11 6 1.65 1 0 1 
Greece Code 17 10 0.77 1 0 1 
Hong Kong Common 3 2 1.60 0 0 0 
Hungary Code 13 7 0.83 1 0 1 
Iceland Code N.A. N.A. 1.98 1 1 0 
Ireland Common 1 1 1.57 1 0 1 
Italy Code 12 7 0.46 1 0 1 
Luxembourg Code 18 12 1.82 1 0 1 
Netherlands Code 4 3 1.75 1 1 0 
Norway Code 7 6 1.91 1 1 0 
Philippines Code 10 10 -0.37 0 0 0 
Poland Code 12 10 0.42 1 0 1 
Portugal Code 13 7 1.19 1 0 1 
South Africa Common 0 0 0.13 0 0 0 
Spain Code 16 9 1.10 1 0 1 
Sweden Code 10 7 1.78 1 0 1 
Switzerland Code 12 7 1.89 0 0 0 
United Kingdom Common 1 1 1.55 1 1 0 
Venezuela Code 5 3 -1.23 0 0 0 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
This table reports summary statistics of regression variables separately for the pre-adoption (pre-2005) and post-adoption (post-2005) periods and for IFRS and 
non-IFRS countries, respectively. Issue is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm issued at least one management forecast in year t, and zero otherwise. Freq 
is the number of forecasts issued by a firm in year t. Size is the natural logarithm of market value of equity in year t-1. ROA is net income divided by total assets 
in year t-1. BTM is the book-to-market ratio in year t-1. Leverage is long-term debt divided by total assets in year t-1. EarnVol is the standard deviation of five 
annual earnings divided by total assets in year t-1. RetVol is the natural logarithm of the standard deviation of five annual stock returns in year t-1. Analysts is the 
number of analysts following in year t-1. Inst is the percentage of foreign institutional ownership in year t-1. BadNews is an indicator variable equal to one if the 
firm had a negative change in earnings in year t. EquityIssue is an indicator variable equal to one if the split-adjusted number of shares increased by 20 percent or 
more in year t+1. ADR is a firm-level indicator variable equal to one if a firm has ADR traded in the US. Interim is mandatory reporting frequency in year t, 
defined as one for annual reporting, two for semi-annual reporting, and four for quarterly reporting. This table also reports univariate difference-in-difference 
results. The “Difference” column compares mean values in pre- and post-adoption periods using a t-test. The “Diff-in-diff” column reports the mean difference-
in-difference between IFRS countries and non-IFRS countries using a t-test. 
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  Pre-IFRS adoption Post-IFRS adoption Difference  (Post-Pre) 
Diff-in-diff  
(IFRS-Non-IFRS) 
  N Mean Median Std Dev N Mean Median Std Dev Mean t Mean t 
 IFRS countries 
Issue 7,327 0.14 0.00 0.34 12,965 0.47 0.00 0.50 0.33 55.74 0.27 37.13 
Freq 7,327 0.20 0.00 0.58 12,965 0.92 0.00 1.31 0.72 54.15 0.63 30.21 
Size 7,327 5.02 4.88 2.12 12,965 5.43 5.30 2.14 0.41 13.14 0.20 5.51 
ROA 7,327 0.08 0.10 0.22 12,965 0.09 0.10 0.18 0.01 3.06 0.00 0.58 
BTM 7,327 1.20 0.67 12.19 12,965 1.04 0.57 8.71 -0.16 -1.02 -0.03 -0.16 
Leverage 7,327 0.20 0.18 0.17 12,965 0.21 0.19 0.17 0.01 4.37 0.02 6.68 
EarnVol 7,327 0.15 0.04 1.20 12,965 0.13 0.04 1.53 -0.02 -0.94 0.02 0.29 
RetVol 7,327 -2.17 -2.20 0.54 12,965 -2.19 -2.20 0.55 -0.03 -3.20 0.05 5.23 
Analysts 7,327 4.11 2.00 5.91 12,965 5.05 2.00 6.44 0.94 10.55 0.92 9.28 
Inst 7,327 0.06 0.01 0.14 12,965 0.11 0.03 0.19 0.05 20.98 0.03 11.94 
BadNews 7,327 0.34 0.00 0.47 12,965 0.42 0.00 0.49 0.08 11.54 0.01 0.85 
EquityIssue 7,327 0.11 0.00 0.32 12,965 0.10 0.00 0.30 -0.01 -2.14 0.00 -0.72 
ADR 7,327 0.08 0.00 0.27 12,965 0.07 0.00 0.26 -0.01 -2.00 -0.01 -3.39 
Interim 7,327 2.78 2.00 1.02 12,965 3.97 4.00 0.27 1.19 98.31 0.99 67.27 
Non-IFRS countries 
Issue 22,436 0.45 0.00 0.50 38,149 0.52 1.00 0.50 0.06 14.62   
Freq 22,436 1.37 0.00 1.89 38,149 1.47 1.00 1.91 0.09 5.93   
Size 22,436 5.37 5.22 2.05 38,149 5.59 5.47 2.03 0.21 12.39   
ROA 22,436 0.07 0.08 0.25 38,149 0.08 0.09 0.19 0.01 3.62   
BTM 22,436 1.02 0.75 0.88 38,149 0.88 0.66 0.78 -0.14 -19.41   
Leverage 22,436 0.21 0.19 0.19 38,149 0.21 0.18 0.18 -0.01 -5.58   
EarnVol 22,436 0.22 0.03 6.60 38,149 0.18 0.03 5.30 -0.03 -0.66   
RetVol 22,436 -2.16 -2.19 0.58 38,149 -2.24 -2.25 0.58 -0.07 -15.31   
Analysts 22,436 3.49 1.00 5.35 38,149 3.51 1.00 5.09 0.02 0.40   
Inst 22,436 0.03 0.00 0.08 38,149 0.04 0.01 0.10 0.02 26.26   
BadNews 22,436 0.37 0.00 0.48 38,149 0.45 0.00 0.50 0.07 18.10   
EquityIssue 22,436 0.07 0.00 0.26 38,149 0.06 0.00 0.25 -0.01 -2.86   
ADR 22,436 0.02 0.00 0.15 38,149 0.03 0.00 0.17 0.01 4.68   
Interim 22,436 3.06 4.00 1.01 38,149 3.27 4.00 0.97 0.20 24.08     
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Table 3: Average Effects of IFRS on Management Forecasts 
This table reports multivariate regression results for difference-in-difference analysis. Columns (1) and (2) report the results using all non-IFRS adopters as the 
control group. Columns (3) and (4) report the results using propensity-score-matched non-IFRS adopters as the control group. Columns (5) and (6) report the 
results using voluntary adopters from IFRS-adopting countries as the control group. Post_IFRS is defined as one for observations from the IFRS countries and 
with fiscal year ends on or after the mandatory adoption date, i.e., December 31, 2005, and zero otherwise. Mandatory is a firm-level indicator defined as one for 
mandatory adopters from the IFRS countries. Post_Mandatory is defined as one for mandatory adopters from the IFRS countries and with fiscal year ends on or 
after the mandatory adoption date, i.e., December 31, 2005, and zero otherwise. Other variables are defined in Table 2. We use a logit model for regressions on 
the binary variable, Issue, and a Poisson model for regressions on the count variable, Freq. We report coefficient estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) 
based on robust standard errors clustered by country. All regressions include country, year (calendar year of forecast date), and industry (2-digit SIC) fixed 
effects. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-
tailed), respectively. 
 
    
    
Benchmark:  
All Non-IFRS Adopters 
Benchmark:  
PSM Non-IFRS Adopters     
Benchmark:  
Voluntary Adopters 
 
Pred.  
Sign 
(1) (2) (3) (4)   Pred.  
Sign 
(5) (6) 
 
Issue Freq Issue Freq   Issue Freq 
                    
Post_IFRS + 1.550** 1.221*** 1.131*** 1.055*** Post_Mandatory + 0.187*** 0.166** 
 
 
(0.628) (0.332) (0.329) (0.241)    (0.050) (0.074) 
      
Mandatory - -0.267*** -0.406*** 
      
   (0.042) (0.071) 
Size + 0.261*** 0.141*** 0.236*** 0.161*** Size + 0.165*** 0.171*** 
  
(0.036) (0.007) (0.039) (0.019)    (0.014) (0.020) 
ROA + 0.683*** 0.550*** 0.597*** 0.362*** ROA + 0.253* 0.549** 
  
(0.118) (0.124) (0.139) (0.065)    (0.140) (0.234) 
BTM ? 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.001 0.001 BTM ? -0.001 -0.001 
  
(0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001)    (0.002) (0.002) 
Leverage + 0.288** 0.242*** 0.098 0.138* Leverage + 0.220*** 0.218 
  
(0.125) (0.093) (0.104) (0.072)    (0.065) (0.168) 
EarnVol ? -0.005* -0.009*** -0.012 -0.022 EarnVol ? -0.002 0.007 
  
(0.002) (0.003) (0.018) (0.014)    (0.009) (0.018) 
RetVol ? 0.139* 0.041 0.149** 0.058 RetVol ? 0.112*** 0.151*** 
  
(0.084) (0.041) (0.072) (0.040)    (0.031) (0.044) 
Analysts + 0.027*** 0.012** 0.022** 0.008 Analysts + 0.008*** 0.039*** 
 
 
(0.004) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007)    (0.003) (0.010) 
Inst + 0.595** 0.307*** 0.522*** 0.235*** Inst + 0.277*** 0.614*** 
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(0.252) (0.093) (0.183) (0.059)    (0.080) (0.191) 
BadNews ? -0.148*** -0.086*** -0.140*** -0.091*** BadNews ? -0.041* -0.039 
  
(0.027) (0.010) (0.053) (0.018)    (0.024) (0.061) 
EquityIssue + -0.052*** -0.028 -0.108*** -0.041* EquityIssue + -0.014 -0.065* 
  
(0.016) (0.025) (0.040) (0.024)    (0.032) (0.035) 
ADR + 0.157 0.175** 0.156 0.203** ADR + 0.137*** 0.198*** 
  
(0.119) (0.088) (0.126) (0.079)    (0.053) (0.062) 
Interim + 0.338*** 0.159** 0.356*** 0.136** Interim + 0.097 0.072 
 
 
(0.106) (0.070) (0.123) (0.059)   
 
(0.080) (0.088) 
 
     
  χ
2-test for Post_Mandatory+Mandatory=0 [p-value] 
      
Post_Mandatory+Mandatory 
 
[0.00] [0.01] 
 
Year, Country, and Industry Fixed Effects Included Year, Country, and Industry Fixed Effects Included 
Observations 
 
80,877 80,877 40,584 40,584 Observations 
 
24,356 24,356 
Pseudo Rsq   0.220 0.242 0.226 0.276 Pseudo Rsq   0.274 0.264 
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Table 4: Analysis of Legal Regime 
This table reports multivariate regression results for difference-in-difference analysis using all non-IFRS adopters as the control group. We split the treatment 
effect into countries with common-law and code-law origin. Post_IFRSCommon (Post_IFRSCode) is defined as one for observations from the IFRS countries with 
common-law (code-law) origin and with fiscal year ends on or after the mandatory adoption date, i.e., December 31, 2005, and zero otherwise. Other variables 
are defined in Table 2. We use a logit model for regressions on the binary variable, Issue, and a Poisson model for regressions on the count variable, Freq. We 
report coefficient estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) based on robust standard errors clustered by country. All regressions include firm-level controls 
(as defined in Table 3). All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels (two-tailed), respectively.  
          (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Pred. 
Sign Issue Freq Issue Freq 
          
Post_IFRSCommon + 1.383* 1.019*** 1.369** 0.944*** 
  
(0.706) (0.344) (0.563) (0.328) 
Post_IFRSCode + 1.781*** 1.521*** 1.895*** 1.665*** 
 
 
(0.557) (0.303) (0.461) (0.294) 
IFRSCommon -   -1.688*** -1.611*** 
    
(0.510) (0.364) 
IFRSCode -   -2.216*** -2.110*** 
    
(0.431) (0.218) 
 χ
2-test for difference [p-value]: 
Post_IFRSCommon= 
Post_IFRSCode  
[0.19] [0.00] [0.02] [0.00] 
IFRSCommon= 
IFRSCode 
 
  [0.16] [0.14] 
IFRSCommon+Post_IFRSCommon= 
IFRSCode+Post_IFRSCode    
[0.99] [0.49] 
      Firm-level Controls 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Fixed Effects 
 
Yes Yes No No 
Observations 
 
80,877 80,877 80,877 80,877 
Pseudo Rsq   0.220 0.242 0.174 0.189 
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Table 5: Analysis of Changes in Disclosure Incentive 
This table reports multivariate regression results for difference-in-difference analysis using all non-IFRS adopters as the control group. We use changes in 
earnings quality, shareholder demand, and analyst demand as interaction variables. Earnings quality is defined as discretionary accruals using a modified Jones 
(1991) model multiplied by -1. Shareholder demand is defined as the percentage of foreign institutional ownership. Analyst demand is defined as the number of 
analysts following. Changes are calculated using the average between 2005 and 2010 minus the average between 2002 and 2004. ΔIncentive is defined as one for 
firms from IFRS countries with above-median changes in earnings quality, shareholder demand, or analyst demand, and zero otherwise. Other variables are 
defined in Table 4. We use a Poisson model for regressions on the count variable, Freq. We report coefficient estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) 
based on robust standard errors clustered by country. All regressions include firm-level controls (as defined in Table 3), country, year (calendar year of forecast 
date), and industry (2-digit SIC) fixed effects. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively.  
 
                
  Earnings Quality Shareholder Demand Analyst Demand 
 Pred.  
Sign 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Freq Freq Freq Freq Freq Freq 
                
Post _IFRS + 1.219***  1.197***  1.207***  
  (0.313)  (0.324)  (0.325)  
Post _IFRS × Δ Incentive + 0.114**  0.077  0.066  
  (0.046)  (0.067)  (0.056)  
Post_IFRSCommon +  1.034***  1.086***  1.100*** 
   (0.330)  (0.337)  (0.339) 
Post_IFRSCode +  1.466***  1.413***  1.391*** 
   (0.284)  (0.305)  (0.303) 
Post_IFRSCommon × Δ Incentive +  0.092**  -0.055  -0.075 
   (0.046)  (0.043)  (0.071) 
Post_IFRSCode × Δ Incentive +  0.164***  0.133*  0.160** 
   (0.052)  (0.072)  (0.076) 
        
  Firm-level Controls Included 
  Year, Country, and Industry Fixed Effects Included 
Pseudo Rsq  0.253 0.253 0.253 0.253 0.253 0.253 
Observations   68,537 68,537 68,537 68,537 68,537 68,537 
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Table 6: Analysis of Alternative Channels 
This table reports multivariate regression results for difference-in-difference analysis using all non-IFRS adopters as the control group. In Columns (1) and (2), 
ΔIncentive is defined as one for firms in high litigation risk industries (i.e., with SIC being in 2833-2936, 3570-3577, 7370-7374, 3600-3674, 5200-5961, and 
8731-8734), and zero otherwise. In Columns (3) to (4), ΔIncentive is defined as one for firms in financial industries (i.e., with SIC being in 6000-6999), and zero 
otherwise. In Columns (5) to (8), we use changes in peer pressure and earnings volatility as interaction variables. We use industry uniformity to measure peer 
pressure, defined as the number of firms within the same industry that use the same accounting standards. Changes in peer pressure are calculated using the 
average between 2005 and 2010 minus the average between 2002 and 2004. Changes in earnings volatility are calculated as the standard deviation of annual 
earnings divided by total assets for years between 2005 and 2010 minus the standard deviation of annual earnings divided by total assets for years between 2002 
and 2004. ΔIncentive is defined as one for firms from IFRS countries with above-median changes in peer pressure or earnings volatility, and zero otherwise. We 
use a Poisson model for all regressions. We report coefficient estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) based on robust standard errors clustered by country. 
All regressions include firm-level controls (as defined in Table 3), country, year (calendar year of forecast date), and industry (2-digit SIC) fixed effects. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), 
respectively.  
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Litigation  
Risk 
Financial 
Industries 
Peer  
Pressure 
Earnings  
Volatility 
 Pred.  
Sign 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Freq Freq Freq Freq Freq Freq Freq Freq 
           
Post _IFRS + 1.269***  1.314***  1.203***  1.240***  
  (0.312)  (0.331)  (0.311)  (0.318)  
Post _IFRS×ΔIncentive + -0.399***  0.148  0.066  0.005  
  (0.083)  (0.110)  (0.050)  (0.039)  
Post_IFRSCommon +  1.092***  1.119***  1.032***  1.020*** 
   (0.327)  (0.373)  (0.332)  (0.328) 
Post_IFRSCode +  1.507***  1.585***  1.540***  1.509*** 
   (0.284)  (0.321)  (0.257)  (0.286) 
Post_IFRSCommon×ΔIncentive +  -0.404***  0.202  0.073  0.075 
   (0.061)  (0.141)  (0.056)  (0.058) 
Post_IFRSCode×ΔIncentive +  -0.376**  -0.063  -0.057  -0.039 
   (0.147)  (0.158)  (0.089)  (0.045) 
          
  Firm-level Controls Included 
  Year, Country, and Industry Fixed Effects Included Pseudo Rsq  0.253 0.253 0.242 0.242 0.253 0.253 0.253 0.253 
Observations   68,537 68,537 91,602 91,602 68,537 68,537 68,537 68,537 
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Table 7: Analysis of Persistence of Forecasts 
In Columns (1) and (2), we split the treatment effect into different years. Post_IFRS20XX is defined as one for 
observations from the IFRS countries, with fiscal year ends on or after the mandatory adoption date, and the forecast 
date in 20XX.  In Columns (3) and (4), Increase is a dummy variable defined as one if forecast frequency increased 
from the prior period, and zero otherwise. Other variables are defined in Tables 2 and 4. We use a logit model for 
regressions on the binary variables, Issue and Increase, and a Poisson model for regressions on the count variable, 
Freq. We report coefficient estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) based on robust standard errors clustered 
by country. All regressions include firm-level controls (as defined in Table 3), country, year (calendar year of 
forecast date), and industry (2-digit SIC) fixed effects. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively.  
            
 Pred.  
Sign 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Issue Freq Increase Increase 
      
Post _IFRS +   1.327**  
    (0.569)  
Post _IFRS2005 + 0.570*** 0.793***  1.672** 
  (0.170) (0.083)  (0.839) 
Post _IFRS2006 + 1.365*** 1.426***  2.151** 
  (0.276) (0.322)  (0.943) 
Post _IFRS2007 + 2.186*** 1.577***  1.882** 
  (0.812) (0.474)  (0.811) 
Post _IFRS2008 + 1.686*** 1.371***  1.123*** 
  (0.483) (0.252)  (0.282) 
Post _IFRS2009 + 2.038** 1.524***  1.964* 
  (0.919) (0.424)  (1.011) 
Post _IFRS2010 + 2.410** 1.748***  2.040*** 
  (0.996) (0.412)  (0.768) 
      
  
Firm-level Controls Included 
 
 
Year, Country, and Industry Fixed Effects Included 
Pseudo Rsq  0.226 0.244 0.105 0.111 
Observations   80,877 80,877 80,877 80,877 
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Table 8: Analysis of GAAP Distance and Enforcement 
In Columns (1) to (6), only firms from IFRS countries are used, and Index is defined as a BaeScore, BaeAcct, or 
Enforcement index (as defined in Table 1). Columns (7) to (12) report regression results for difference-in-difference 
analysis using all non-IFRS adopters as the control group. In Columns (7) and (8), we exclude EU countries with 
bundled enforcement changes, i.e., EU_ENF=1. In Columns (9) to (12), we split the treatment effect into countries 
within and outside the EU. The former is further split into those with and without bundled enforcement changes, as 
classified by Christensen et al. (2013). Post_IFRSEU_ENF is defined as one for observations from the EU with fiscal 
year ends on or after the mandatory adoption date, and zero otherwise. Post_IFRSEU_ENF is defined as one for 
observations from EU countries with bundled enforcement changes and fiscal year ends on or after the mandatory 
adoption date, and zero otherwise. Post_IFRSEU_nonENF is defined as one for observations from EU countries that do 
not have bundled enforcement changes with fiscal year ends on or after the mandatory adoption date, and zero 
otherwise. Post_IFRSnon-EU is defined as one for observations from the IFRS countries but outside the EU (EU=0) 
with fiscal year ends on or after the mandatory adoption date, and zero otherwise. We also report p-values of χ2-tests 
by comparing the coefficients of Post_IFRSEU with Post_IFRSnon-EU and Post_IFRSEU_ENF with Post_IFRSEU_nonENF. 
See Table 1, Panel C, for definitions of BaeScore, BaeAcct, Enforcement, EU, EU_ENF, and EU_nonENF. Other 
variables are defined in Table 3. We use a logit model for regressions on the binary variable, Issue, and a Poisson 
model for regressions on the count variable, Freq. We report coefficient estimates and standard errors (in 
parentheses) based on robust standard errors clustered by country. All regressions include firm-level controls (as 
defined in Table 3), country, year (calendar year of forecast date), and industry (2-digit SIC) fixed effects. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively.  
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BaeScore BaeAcct Enforcement 
 
Pred.  
Sign 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Freq Issue Freq Issue Freq Issue 
                
Post_IFRS×Index + 0.030** 0.033* 0.046** 0.052* 0.055 0.121 
  (0.013) (0.019) (0.022) (0.031) (0.069) (0.116) 
        Observations  20,281 20,281 20,281 20,281 20,292 20,292 
Pseudo Rsq   0.266 0.249 0.266 0.250 0.265 0.249 
     
  
Ex. EU countries with 
Bundled Enforcement 
Changes 
EU vs.  
Non-EU 
EU with vs.  
without Bundled 
Enforcement Changes 
 
Pred.  
Sign 
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
Freq Issue Freq Issue Freq Issue 
 
              
Post_IFRS  + 1.291*** 1.726** 
    
  
(0.358) (0.727) 
    Post_IFRSEU + 
  
1.308*** 1.520*** 
  
    
(0.330) (0.574) 
  Post_IFRSEU ENF + 
    
1.147*** 1.335** 
      
(0.343) (0.576) 
Post_IFRSEU nonENF + 
    
1.513*** 1.773*** 
      
(0.304) (0.565) 
Post_IFRSnon-EU + 
  
1.082*** 1.617** 1.080*** 1.608** 
    
(0.367) (0.788) (0.368) (0.788) 
  
 χ
2-test for difference [p-value]: 
Post_IFRSEU= 
Post_IFRSnon-EU 
 
  [0.23] [0.79]   
Post_IFRSEU_ENF= 
Post_IFRSEU nonENF 
 
    [0.08] [0.04] 
        Observations  72,156 72,156 80,877 80,877 80,877 80,877 
Pseudo Rsq   0.234 0.220 0.242 0.220 0.242 0.220 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
Internet Appendix  
to 
“Mandatory Financial Reporting and Voluntary Disclosure: The Effect of 
Mandatory IFRS Adoption on Management Forecasts” 
 
 
 
  
 
 
2 
 
 
Internet Appendix I: Capital IQ Data and Forecast Type 
Capital IQ started collecting information on corporate guidance in text format from 
January 2002 for firms across 90 countries using various public sources, including press releases 
and articles from more than 20,000 news wires and publications, regulatory files, company 
websites, web agents, conference call transcripts, and investor conference organizer websites. If 
the information is in local languages, Capital IQ translates the manuscript into English. Capital 
IQ also provides information on company identifiers, forecast headlines, news sources, and 
forecasting dates in a machine-readable format, which allows for easy merge with other 
databases. We extract texts of management earnings guidance from Capital IQ Key Development 
by performing a search for keywords, including “Earning”, “earning”, and “EPS”,  in headlines 
and main texts under the Key Development Type “Corporate Guidance”. We download all 
output guidance issued between 2002 and 2010. To remove possible duplications, if multiple 
news articles are issued on the same date for the same firm, we keep only one observation in our 
sample. A summary of the initial sample of forecasts downloaded from Capital IQ is provided in 
Table IA1. We also tabulate the number of forecasts issued between 2004 and 2009, the sample 
period used in Radhakrishnan, Tsang, and Yang (2012) and find a similar sample composition.1  
Capital IQ also classifies Key Development Types into either “New/Confirmed” or 
“Raised/Lowered”. To separate new forecasts from forecast confirmations, we use information 
from Key Development Headline. A forecast is identified as “Confirmed” if its type is 
“New/Confirmed” and its headline contains keywords “affirm”, “Affirm”, “reiterate”, or 
“Reiterate”. A forecast is identified as “New” if its type is “New/Confirmed” and its headline 
                                                 
1 Our final sample is significantly smaller than that of Radhakrishnan et al. (2012) because we require firm-level 
data from Compustat Global for all of our analyses, whereas all tests in Radhakrishnan et al. (2012) are conducted at 
the country level. 
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does not contain any of the keywords above. A forecast is identified as a revision if its type is 
“Raised/Lowered”. 
Below we give two examples to illustrate three different forecast types. 
Example 1: A new forecast followed by a forecast revision 
On May 29, 2007, Vodafone Group plc (LSE: VOD) provides earnings 
guidance for the year 2008. For the year, the company expects adjusted operating 
profit to be in the range of £9.3 billion ($18.4 billion) to £9.8 billion ($19.4 
billion). 
On November 13, 2007, Vodafone Group plc revised earnings guidance for 
the full year of fiscal 2008. The company upgraded its revenue guidance to at 
least £34.5 billion (€49 billion; $71.6 billion) and its operating profit to at least 
£9.5 billion (€13.5 billion or $19.7 billion).   
 
Example 2: A new forecast followed by a forecast confirmation and then two 
forecast revisions 
On March 26, 2010, Wacker Neuson SE (DB: WAC) provides earnings 
guidance for the full year of 2010. For the full year of 2010, the company expects 
revenue to rise by at least 5%. The company also expects an increase in EBITDA 
and a return to the profit zone at operating level. 
On May 28, 2010, Wacker Neuson SE confirmed its 2010 forecast for a 
revenue increase of at least 5% and a positive operating result. EBITDA is 
expected to rise on the year.    
On August 10, 2010, Wacker Neuson SE revised up earnings guidance for the 
full year 2010.  Based on its first-half performance, the company lifted its 2010 
outlook to a revenue growth of at least 10% versus the originally anticipated 
minimum of 5%. Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation 
(EBITDA) margin is now expected to reach at least 9%, an improvement from the 
original forecast for a return to the profit zone at operating level. 
On November 12, 2010, Wacker Neuson SE revised up earnings guidance for 
the full year 2010. Based on its performance in the third quarter, the company 
upgraded its full-year forecast and now expects annual revenue growth of at least 
20% and a margin on earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation 
(EBITDA) of minimum 10%. 
 
To analyze the impact of IFRS adoption on the different forecast types, we separately 
count the number of new forecasts Freq(New), forecast revisions Freq(Revision), and forecast 
confirmations Freq(Confirm). We repeat the analysis in Table 3 by replacing the forecast 
frequency variable (Freq) with the frequency of three respective forecast types. The results are 
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reported in Table IA2. We find consistent results across all three types, suggesting that IFRS 
adoption not only encourages managers to issue more forecasts, but also makes them update 
forecasts more frequently.   
 
Internet Appendix II: Additional Analysis 
Analysis of Other Stakeholders 
We conduct further analysis on the role of equity markets versus other stakeholders, 
including government, labor unions, and lenders. We measure the size of a country’s equity 
market as the average equity market capitalization relative to its GDP (Equity) for the period 
1999-2003 obtained from World Development Indicators at the World Bank on-line database. 
We measure a country’s government involvement using its state ownership (SOE), defined as 
government enterprise and investment at the country-year level. It is scaled from 0 to 10, with 
higher scores suggesting fewer state-owned enterprises. The data is obtained from Economic 
Freedom of the World. We multiply this measure by -1, so that a higher value indicates more 
government involvement. We measure a country’s labor union power using the density of its 
labor unions (Union), measured as the percentage of employees as members of a trade union at 
the country-year level. The data is obtained from the OECD employment on-line database. 
Lastly, we measure the size of a country’s credit market (Credit) using domestic credit provided 
by the banking sector as a percentage of GDP for each country-year. The data is obtained from 
World Development Indicators at World Bank on-line database.  
We re-estimate Equation (1) by allowing the coefficient on Post_IFRS to differ between 
treatment countries with high (above-median) and low values of Equity, SOE, Union, or Credit. 
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The results are reported in Table IA3. We observe that all country groups issue more 
management forecasts post-IFRS adoption relative to the control group. By comparing 
coefficients across high and low stakeholder groups, we observe larger increases in management 
forecasts following IFRS adoption among countries with higher government involvement and 
smaller equity markets, although this result only holds for regressions on forecasting frequency. 
This finding provides some limited support to the catching-up effect for firms in countries where 
the demand for public disclosure was initially low. We do not find the coefficient on Post_IFRS 
to differ when using labor unions and credit market size as partitions, suggesting similar positive 
effects of IFRS adoption on management forecasts across countries with high and low union and 
creditor influence.  
Robustness Analysis 
We conduct a battery of analysis to check the sensitivity of our main results. 
Transparency Directive. Another regulatory change within EU that might influence our 
results is the Transparency Directive, which effectively increased firms’ reporting frequency 
from semiannual reporting to quarterly reporting for many EU countries. Although we have 
included firms’ mandatory reporting frequency (Interim) in all our regression analysis, we 
further explore the impact of the Transparency Directive on our results. Table IA4, Panel A 
reports the effective date of the Transparency Directive for our sample countries obtained from 
Christensen et al. (2013b). We re-estimate Equation (1) by adding an additional indicator 
variable Post_TPD defined as one for forecasts issued after the Transparency Directive effective 
date. The regression results are reported in Table IA4, Panel B, Columns (1) and (2). The 
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coefficient on Post_TPD is positive but only significant for the regression on Freq. More 
importantly, we continue to find the coefficient on Post_IFRS to be positive and significant.  
Capital IQ coverage. A common concern about databases that provide machine-readable 
information for management forecasts is their completeness and biases in coverage. For example, 
by comparing management forecasts provided by Thomson First Call’s Company Issued 
Guidance database with a random sample of management forecasts hand-collected from 
newswires, Chuk, Matsumoto, and Miller (2013) find that the former tends to cover large firms 
with high analyst following and institutional ownership and that the coverage is more complete 
after 1997. Although Capital IQ uses a different data collection process from First Call, it might 
not be immune to this criticism.2 In particular, we cannot distinguish when a firm did not issue 
any management forecasts in a certain year from when the firm was not covered by Capital IQ in 
that particular year. As a result, our finding that management forecasts increased following IFRS 
adoption could be driven by Capital IQ’s expanded coverage over time. Although our difference-
in-difference research design has already taken into account any systematic time trends existing 
in the data, one may argue that the coverage expansion might be more in favor of the treatment 
sample, which includes some small economies. If this is the case, having a control group would 
not entirely control for such a bias. We further address this concern in several ways. First, we 
limit our sample period to between 2004 and 2010, as Radhakrishnan et al. (2012) suggest that 
the coverage of Capital IQ is likely to be more complete after 2004. Second, we restrict the 
analysis to firm-years with at least one forecast, i.e., Freq>0, and then examine the impact of 
IFRS adoption on the number of forecasts. In this way, we limit our sample to firms that are 
                                                 
2 Capital IQ simply provides all management forecasts in text format and does not code the content of forecasts. 
Therefore, the bias in First Call that quantitative and bad-news forecasts are more likely to be covered (Chuk et al., 
2013) is unlikely to apply to Capital IQ. 
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already covered by Capital IQ. Third, we restrict the analysis to firms that were forecasters in the 
pre-adoption period and examine the changes in their forecast behavior after the adoption. The 
results are reported in Table IA4, Panel B, Columns (3) to (6). We continue to find the 
coefficient on Post_IFRS to be positive and significant across all model specifications. Another 
potential bias is a higher likelihood to cover English-speaking countries by Capital IQ, although 
the data provider suggests that they cover both English and non-English information sources. To 
address this concern, we limit our sample to English-speaking countries only and repeat the 
analysis. The results as reported in Columns (7) and (8) remain unchanged. The above findings 
suggest that the observed increase in management forecasts after IFRS adoption is unlikely to be 
driven by potential coverage biases existing in the Capital IQ database.  
Different sample composition and time period. To addresses the concern that our 
results might be driven by different sample compositions in the pre- and post-adoption periods, 
we repeat the analysis using a constant sample, where each firm in the treatment sample exists in 
both pre- and post-adoption periods. These results, as reported in Table IA4, Panel B, Columns 
(9) and (10), remain unchanged. Our sample period runs from 2002 to 2010 and spans the 
financial crisis which affected the IFRS adopting countries in the EU severely. If firms affected 
by the crisis provided more disclosure to reduce the uncertainty faced by investors, we would 
observe an increase in management forecasts in the post-crisis period. To rule out this alternative 
explanation, we limit our sample to the pre-crisis period, i.e. before July 2007 or September 
2008. Our results, as reported in Table IA4, Columns (11) to (14), remain unchanged. 
Country-level analysis. So far, our regressions are conducted at the firm level. To 
address the concern that our results might be biased towards large economies with large sample 
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sizes, we repeat our analysis at the country level. Following the methodology in Landsman et al. 
(2012), we estimate the following equation separately for each country: 
 DISC = β1Post + Firm controls + Industry F. E.   (3) 
where Post is defined as one for fiscal years ending on or after December 31, 2005, and other 
variables are defined in the same way as before. Since the regression includes a Post dummy and 
is conducted separately for each country, we do not include year or country fixed effects. Table 
IA5 reports the mean coefficients and Fama and Macbeth (1973) standard errors and t-statistics 
for IFRS and non-IFRS countries separately. A few countries are dropped due to small sample 
size for country-specific regressions. We observe that 14 out of 21 (10 out of 10) coefficients on 
Post for regressions using firms from IFRS (non-IFRS) countries are positive, suggesting that 
management forecasts increase in the post-adoption period in both IFRS and non-IFRS countries. 
The last two columns report the difference in coefficients across these two samples. We find that 
the difference in the coefficient on Post between IFRS and non-IFRS countries is 0.556 and is 
statistically significant (t-statistic=7.628). This corroborates our findings in the firm-level 
analysis. We obtain qualitatively similar results when we use Issue as the dependent variable 
(unreported). 
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Table IA1: Distribution of Management Forecasts in the Original Sample 
          
Country 
No. of 
forecasts 
(2002-
2010) 
No. of 
firm-
years 
(2002-
2010) 
No. of 
forecasts 
(2004-
2009) 
No. of 
firm-
years 
(2004-
2009) 
Country 
No. of 
forecasts 
(2002-
2010) 
No. of 
firm-
years 
(2002-
2010) 
No. of 
forecasts 
(2004-
2009) 
No. of 
firm-
years 
(2004-
2009) 
Albania 3 2 3 2 Greece 252 189 233 174 
Algeria 4 4 3 3 Greenland 6 3 3 2 
Argentina 21 20 14 13 Hong Kong 1298 977 838 640 
Armenia 3 3 3 3 Hungary 260 190 213 154 
Australia 5579 3025 4399 2439 Iceland 36 24 26 18 
Austria 743 379 604 305 India 891 677 720 546 
Bahamas 11 8 5 4 Indonesia 528 378 421 302 
Bahrain 13 12 10 9 Ireland 723 310 572 242 
Bangladesh 4 4 4 4 Israel 817 386 691 320 
Barbados 2 2 2 2 Italy 1004 639 852 542 
Belarus 2 2 1 1 Jamaica 4 4 3 3 
Belgium 511 287 399 234 Japan 41699 15875 39064 14810 
Bermuda 319 167 238 124 Jordan 8 7 5 4 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 18 15 13 10 Kazakhstan 56 44 44 36 
Brazil 248 195 182 153 Kenya 16 14 9 8 
British Virgin Islands 13 9 11 7 Kuwait 35 28 25 19 
Bulgaria 221 141 200 134 Kyrgyzstan 2 2 2 2 
Canada 3620 1934 2517 1325 Latvia 89 76 73 64 
Cayman Islands 63 33 50 25 Lebanon 3 3 3 3 
Channel Islands 74 41 50 25 Liechtenstein 6 4 5 3 
Chile 55 49 47 41 Lithuania 435 218 405 198 
China 4189 2214 3019 1655 Luxembourg 186 92 137 71 
Colombia 33 31 28 27 Macau 4 3 2 1 
Croatia 64 54 45 40 Macedonia 16 16 7 7 
Cyprus 628 423 475 327 Malaysia 944 777 626 531 
Czech Republic 330 250 303 229 Malta 6 5 4 3 
Denmark 2150 889 1700 740 Mauritius 3 3 2 2 
Ecuador 3 3 3 3 Mexico 152 91 110 70 
Egypt 16 15 8 8 Moldova 14 12 10 9 
Estonia 53 47 49 43 Monaco 6 5 4 3 
Fiji 2 2 2 2 Mongolia 2 2 2 2 
Finland 1448 642 1073 518 Montenegro 2 2 1 1 
France 2372 1333 1824 1068 Morocco 10 8 7 5 
Georgia 3 3 2 2 Namibia 3 2 3 2 
Germany 5616 2442 4471 2013 Netherlands 1105 578 877 468 
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Gibraltar 8 5 4 3 Netherlands Antilles 33 13 24 9 
New Zealand 649 384 511 308 South Korea 404 297 345 260 
Nigeria 59 54 28 25 Spain 529 385 439 320 
Norway 307 224 211 160 Sri Lanka 16 14 13 11 
Oman 11 11 8 8 Sweden 604 379 479 308 
Pakistan 41 39 31 29 Switzerland 1245 700 1018 581 
Panama 9 8 6 5 Taiwan 491 300 410 251 
Papua New Guinea 12 11 8 8 Tanzania 6 6 2 2 
Peru 14 13 12 11 Thailand 1451 894 1268 768 
Philippines 459 291 365 236 Trinidad & Tobago 3 2 1 1 
Poland 651 404 618 383 Tunisia 5 5 4 4 
Portugal 139 109 101 85 Turkey 45 39 32 29 
Qatar 17 15 12 12 Uganda 3 3 2 2 
Romania 672 454 615 404 Ukraine 106 86 81 65 
Russia 1189 697 939 562 United Arab Emirates 93 80 69 61 
Rwanda 6 3 
  
United Kingdom 3486 2500 2637 1945 
Saudi Arabia 17 15 14 12 United States 65037 22389 49290 16044 
Serbia 51 40 35 28 Uruguay 6 6 6 6 
Singapore 733 496 501 341 Venezuela 15 12 11 9 
Slovakia 53 52 51 50 Vietnam 1780 888 659 391 
Slovenia 166 108 140 92 Zimbabwe 7 6 2 1 
South Africa 528 421 421 345 Total 34,225 18,534 26,388 14,645 
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Table IA2: Analysis of Management Forecast Types 
This table repeats the analysis in Table 3 by using different forecast types. Feq(New) measures the number of new forecasts, Freq(Revision) measures the number 
of forecast revisions, and Freq(Confirm) measures the number of forecast confirmations. We use a Poisson model for all regressions. We report coefficient 
estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) based on robust standard errors clustered by country. All regressions include country, year (calendar year of 
forecast date), and industry (2-digit SIC) fixed effects. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
                    
 
Benchmark:  
All Non-IFRS Adopters 
Benchmark:  
PSM Non-IFRS Adopters   
Benchmark:  
Voluntary Adopters 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)   (7) (8) (9) 
 
Freq 
(New) 
Freq 
(Revision) 
Freq 
(Confirm) 
Freq 
(New) 
Freq 
(Revision) 
Freq 
(Confirm)   
Freq 
(New) 
Freq 
(Revision) 
Freq 
(Confirm) 
                      
Post_IFRS 0.982*** 1.369*** 1.593*** 0.868*** 1.203*** 1.298*** Post_Mandatory 0.190*** 0.203*** 0.171** 
 (0.221) (0.399) (0.443) (0.158) (0.273) (0.414)   (0.055) (0.072) (0.080) 
       Mandatory -0.267*** -0.241*** -0.277*** 
         (0.052) (0.093) (0.085) 
Size 0.142*** 0.166*** 0.139*** 0.157*** 0.181*** 0.163*** Size 0.144*** 0.197*** 0.242*** 
 (0.013) (0.028) (0.041) (0.011) (0.050) (0.046)   (0.015) (0.022) (0.030) 
ROA 0.488*** 0.897*** 0.618*** 0.330*** 0.677*** 0.703** ROA 0.242 0.606*** -0.015 
 (0.085) (0.286) (0.199) (0.071) (0.108) (0.302)   (0.156) (0.123) (0.270) 
BTM 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.001 BTM -0.000 -0.016 -0.109* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002)   (0.001) (0.020) (0.062) 
Leverage 0.098 0.522*** 0.395*** -0.018 0.454*** 0.255*** Leverage 0.185*** 0.427*** 0.222* 
 (0.067) (0.094) (0.103) (0.069) (0.077) (0.097)   (0.063) (0.113) (0.127) 
EarnVol -0.006*** -0.025 -0.037 -0.016 -0.046 -0.023 EarnVol 0.000 -0.101 -0.106 
 (0.001) (0.018) (0.036) (0.016) (0.030) (0.016)   (0.009) (0.087) (0.115) 
RetVol 0.049 0.020 -0.008 0.063* 0.032 0.077* RetVol 0.099** 0.215*** 0.134*** 
 (0.040) (0.043) (0.032) (0.035) (0.043) (0.045)   (0.041) (0.046) (0.037) 
Analysts 0.011*** 0.014 0.008 0.006 0.014 0.006 Analysts 0.008** 0.009** 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.011) (0.011)   (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Inst 0.288** 0.332** 0.280** 0.267*** 0.241* 0.078 Inst 0.175** 0.604*** 0.543*** 
 (0.118) (0.139) (0.110) (0.074) (0.131) (0.184)   (0.072) (0.206) (0.195) 
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BadNews -0.072*** -0.084 -0.162*** -0.071*** -0.090 -0.167*** BadNews -0.028* -0.041 -0.111** 
 (0.021) (0.099) (0.030) (0.016) (0.082) (0.025)   (0.016) (0.095) (0.053) 
EquityIssue -0.033 0.034 -0.064 -0.053* 0.010 0.053 EquityIssue 0.001 0.053 -0.167 
 (0.027) (0.074) (0.066) (0.029) (0.060) (0.141)   (0.029) (0.068) (0.107) 
ADR 0.205** 0.142 0.271*** 0.197** 0.204* 0.393*** ADR 0.122** 0.113 0.198*** 
 (0.097) (0.120) (0.089) (0.084) (0.123) (0.132)   (0.056) (0.116) (0.075) 
Interim 0.247*** 0.113** -0.027 0.225*** 0.083* -0.097** Interim 0.096 0.074 0.163 
 (0.075) (0.051) (0.044) (0.060) (0.048) (0.040)   (0.071) (0.099)  
         χ
2-test for Post_Mandatory+Mandatory=0 [p-value] 
       
Post_Mandatory 
+Mandatory [0.02] [0.00] [0.01] 
 Year, Country, and Industry Fixed Effects Included Year, Country, and Industry Fixed Effects Included 
Observations 80,877 80,877 80,877 40,584 40,584 40,584 Pseudo Rsq 24356 24356 24356 
Pseudo Rsq 0.208 0.225 0.216 0.227 0.267 0.236 Observations 0.219 0.223 0.255 
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Table IA3: Analysis of Stakeholder Influence 
This table repeats the analysis in Table 4, Columns (1) and (2) by replacing legal origins with stakeholder influence. 
SOE includes government enterprise and investment measured at the country-year level. It is scaled from 0 to 10, 
with higher scores suggesting fewer state-owned enterprises or lower government influence. The data is obtained 
from Economic Freedom of the World. We multiply the measure by -1 so that higher values indicate higher 
government influence. Equity is equity market capitalization of a country relative to its GDP for the period 1999-
2003 obtained from World Development Indicators at the World Bank on-line database. Union is density of labor 
union and is measured as the percentage of employees who are members of a trade union at the country-year level. 
The data is obtained from OECD employment on-line database. Credit is domestic credit provided by banking sector 
as a percentage of GDP for each country-year. The data is obtained from World Development Indicators at the 
World Bank on-line database. Post_IFRSHigh (Post_IFRSLow) is defined as one for observations from the IFRS 
countries with high (low) stakeholder influence and with fiscal year ends on or after mandatory adoption date, i.e. 
December 31, 2005, and zero otherwise. Countries with above-median values of SOE, Equity/GDP, Union, and 
Credit are classified as having high stakeholder influence. Sample median is calculated using IFRS countries only. 
We use a Logit model for regressions on the binary variable, Issue, and a Poisson model for regressions on count 
variables Freq. We report coefficient estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) based on robust standard errors 
clustered by country. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively.  
 
 
SOE Equity Union Credit 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Pred. Sign Issue Freq Issue Freq Issue Freq Issue Freq 
                    
Post_IFRSHigh + 1.869** 1.444*** 1.215** 1.057*** 1.534** 1.254*** 1.579** 1.190*** 
  
(0.821) (0.392) (0.581) (0.329) (0.644) (0.349) (0.757) (0.364) 
Post_IFRSLow + 1.391** 1.133*** 1.822*** 1.314*** 1.880** 1.245*** 1.586*** 1.301*** 
 
 
(0.570) (0.317) (0.651) (0.355) (0.748) (0.357) (0.465) (0.283) 
 
         
  χ
2-test for difference [p-value]: 
Post_IFRSHigh= 
Post_IFRSLow  
[0.19] [0.01] [0.00] [0.18] [0.15] [0.88] [0.99] [0.51] 
  
Firm-level Controls Included 
 
 
Year, Country, and Industry Fixed Effects Included 
          Observations 
 
0.221 0.242 0.221 0.242 0.215 0.223 0.225 0.243 
Pseudo Rsq   80,839 80,839 80,877 80,877 72,016 72,016 79,087 79,087 
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Table IA4: Robustness Analysis 
Panel A reports the Transparency Directive date for IFRS countries. TPD Date is the effective date (year and month) 
of the Transparency Directive and is obtained from Christensen et al. (2013b). Panel B reports multivariate 
regression results for difference-in-difference analysis using all non-IFRS adopters as the control group. In Columns 
(1) and (2), Post_TPD is defined as one for observations from the IFRS countries and if the forecast was issued after 
the Transparency Directive date, and zero otherwise. It is defined as zero for observations from IFRS countries 
without Transparency Directive date. In Columns (3) and (4), we keep only forecasts issued between 2004 and 2010. 
In Column (5), only forecasters, i.e. firm-years with at least one forecast, are used in the regression. In Column (6), 
only firms that forecasted in the pre-adoption period are used in the regression. In Columns (7) and (8), we keep 
only English-speaking countries in our sample, including Australia, Hong Kong, Ireland, Philippines, the UK, the 
US, India, and Canada. In Columns (9) and (10), we keep only a constant sample of firms, i.e. firms existing in both 
pre- and post-adoption periods. In Columns (11) and (12), we keep only forecasts issued before July 2007, and in 
Columns (13) and (14), we keep only forecasts issued before September 2008. In Columns (15) and (16), we 
exclude all the fixed effects. We use a Logit model for regressions on the binary variable, Issue, and a Poisson 
model for regressions on the count variable, Freq. We report coefficient estimates and standard errors (in 
parentheses) based on robust standard errors clustered by country. All regressions include firm-level controls (as 
defined in Table 3), country, year (calendar year of forecast date), and industry (2-digit SIC) fixed effects. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively.  
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Panel A: Transparency Directive date for IFRS countries  
 
Country TPD date 
Australia  
Austria 200704 
Belgium 200809 
Czech 
Republic 200908 
Denmark 200706 
Germany 200701 
Finland 200702 
France 200712 
Greece 200707 
Hong Kong  
Hungary 200712 
Iceland 200711 
Ireland 200707 
Italy 200904 
Luxembourg 200801 
Netherlands 200901 
Norway 200801 
Philippines  
Poland 200903 
Portugal 200711 
South Africa  
Spain 200712 
Sweden 200707 
Switzerland  
United 
Kingdom 200701 
Venezuela   
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Panel B: Regression results  
            
  Transparency  Directive 2004-2010 
Only 
Forecasters 
Only Pre-
adoption 
Forecasters 
English-speaking countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Freq Issue Freq Issue Freq Freq Freq Issue 
                 
Post_IFRS  1.110*** 1.302** 1.109*** 1.474* 0.426** 0.657** 0.603*** 0.777*** 
 (0.299) (0.512) (0.429) (0.790) (0.170) (0.315) (0.053) (0.126) 
Post_TPD 0.309** 0.669       
 (0.140) (0.485)       
         
Observations 80,877 80,877 64,652 64,652 36,963 45680 40,221 40,221 
Pseudo Rsq 0.242 0.222 0.198 0.165 0.086 0.213 0.191 0.236 
 Constant Sample 
Before  
July 2007 
Before  
September 2008 No Fixed Effects 
 (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
VARIABLES Freq Issue Freq Issue Freq Issue Freq Issue 
                  
Post_IFRS  1.243*** 1.515** 1.070*** 0.931*** 1.103*** 1.121*** 1.353*** 1.440*** 
 (0.316) (0.617) (0.237) (0.208) (0.287) (0.388) (0.413) (0.365) 
         
Observations 68,537 68,537 46,257 46,257 55,732 55,732 80,876 80,876 
Pseudo Rsq 0.218 0.24 0.280 0.288 0.264 0.261 0.117 0.091 
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Table IA5: Country-level Analysis 
This table presents country-level Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression coefficients and statistics using Poisson 
regressions. Post is a dummy variable equal to one for fiscal years ending in or after December 2005. Control 
variables are defined in Table 2. All regressions include industry fixed effects. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  
 
  Non-IFRS Countries   IFRS Countries   IFRS - Non-IFRS 
           
 Dependent Variable = Freq  Dependent Variable = Freq    
  Coef. Std Err t-stat  Coef. Std Err t-stat  Diff t-stat 
           
Post 0.466 0.161 2.898  1.022 0.239 4.278  0.556 7.628 
Size 0.196 0.081 2.426  0.124 0.089 1.394  -0.072 -2.261 
ROA 0.441 0.914 0.483  -0.036 0.696 -0.052  -0.477 -1.461 
BTM -0.010 0.081 -0.124  -0.003 0.131 -0.025  0.007 0.177 
Leverage -0.283 0.386 -0.732  0.117 0.519 0.225  0.400 2.399 
EarnVol -0.035 0.850 -0.041  -0.216 0.960 -0.225  -0.181 -0.530 
RetVol 0.172 0.150 1.152  0.216 0.167 1.296  0.044 0.739 
Analysts -0.006 0.015 -0.414  0.013 0.020 0.662  0.020 3.001 
Inst 0.223 0.582 0.384  0.229 0.436 0.526  0.006 0.028 
BadNews -0.143 0.126 -1.131  -0.034 0.147 -0.231  0.109 2.129 
EquityIssue -0.014 0.305 -0.047  -0.115 0.260 -0.443  -0.101 -0.900 
ADR 0.337 0.278 1.214  0.021 0.286 0.072  -0.316 -2.939 
Interim 0.205 0.270 0.757  0.703 0.296 2.372  0.498 4.643 
           
N 10  21    
N Positive 10  14    
Pseudo Rsq 0.098   0.159       
 
 
